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Family Autonomy vs. Grandparent
Visitation: How Precedent Fell Prey to
Sentiment in Herndon v. Tuhey,
Joan C. Bohl*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a trial court decision
awarding visitation with Cody Christopher Tuhey to the plaintiff grandparents
over the united objections of Cody's parents, Randy and Ann Tuhey.2 The
Tuheys, as married natural parents of unquestioned fitness, had argued that every
theory of constitutionally based privacy and familial autonomy protected the
fundamental child rearing decision of with whom their young son would visit.
The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed.'
* Instructor, Southwestern University School of Law. B.A., 1977, Boston
University; J.D., 1983, Suffolk University Law School.
1. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
2. Id. at 211. After concluding that the grandparent visitation statute was
constitutional and the visitation award itself was proper, the court stated that the amount
of visitation was excessive and remanded the case to the trial court for reassessment. Id.
at 211.
3. Id at 207-08. Fivejudges joined in this majority opinion; two judges dissented.
Currently nineteen states have open ended grandparent visitation statutes: CAL. [FAM.]
CODE § 3100 (a) (West 1994); IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1983) (repealed 1994); IOWA
CODEANN. § 598.35 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616 (1994); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN. [FAM. LAW]
§ 9-102 (1994 & Supp. 96); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1003 (West 1996); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (Supp. 1997); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.402 (1996); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-9-102 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1997); N.Y. [DOM. REL.] LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.3 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 25-4-52 (Michie 1992); VA. CODEANN. § 20-124.2 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 20-7-1-1 (Michie 1997). The first state
to enact an open ended grandparent visitation statute was New York in 1966. Prior to
1966, states typically enacted statutes permitting suits for grandparent visitation only
when the child's family had already suffered disruption through divorce or death of a
parent. After 1966 some states bowed to pressure from politically active older
constituents and broadened extant grandparent visitation statutes to permit suit regardless
of whether family disruption had occurred. For an explanation of the evolution of two
grandparent visitation statutes, see Beagle v. Beagle, 654 So. 2d 1260, 1260-61 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (tracing the evolution of Florida's open-ended grandparent visitation
statute), rev'd, 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla 1996) (holding state grandparent visitation statute
1
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Any gloss of intellectual legitimacy the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion has
acquired must be dispelled.4 Joining the long and sorry tradition of family law
decisions that cloak their authors' subjective views in "best interests of the child"
terminology,5 Herndon v. Tuhey failed to acknowledge controlling, established
unconstitutional); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 576 n.1 (Tenn. 1993) (tracing the
evolution of the open ended grandparent visitation statute, and subsequently concluding
that it violated the Tennessee Constitution); Steward v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777, 781-82
(Nev. 1995) (tracing unsuccessful legislative attempts to expand Nevada's grandparent
visitation statute into an open ended grandparent visitation statute). Missouri's
grandparent visitation statute became open-ended in 1991. See Joan C. Bohi, The
Unprecedented Intrusion: A Survey and Analysis of Selected Grandparent Visitation
Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REv. 29 (1996) for a discussion of the evolution of open-ended
grandparent visitation statutes.
4. The following grandparent visitation cases cite Herndon v. Tuhey: Peterson v.
Peterson, 559 N.W.2d 826 (N.D. 1997); Komosa v. Komosa, 939 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997); Wolinski v. Browneller, 693 A.2d 30 (Md. Ct. App. 1997); Ward v. Dibble,
683 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla.
1996); Pollard v. Pollard, No. 532463, 1995 WL 534244 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25,
1995); Sanchez v. Parker, No. CN93-09822, 1995 WL 489146 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 20,
1995); Ridenour v. Ridenour, 901 P.2d 770 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Campbell v.
Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga.
1995) (Benham, P.J., dissenting); R.T. v. J.E., 650 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1994). Since only 5 state family court opinions are reported, either by state reporters or
by electronic services, the true extent ofHerndon v. Tuhey's influence cannot be gauged
with accuracy. In addition to cases which cite Herndon explicitly, some cases rely upon
its reasoning indirectly by citing one of its progeny. For example, Maner v. Stephenson,
677 A.2d 560 (Md. 1996) cites Campbell v. Campbell for ideas the Campbell court
derived from Herndon v. Tuhey. In addition, Lucerno v. Hart, 907 P.2d 198 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1995), uses a Herndon type analysis but cites to Ridenour v. Ridenour, rather than
to the Ridenour court's source-Herndon v. Tuhey.
5. This inglorious tradition dates back to the sixteenth century, at least. In 1562
Parliament passed the first of several statutes designed to address the education of
children born into poverty. Under the Statute of Artificers, 5 ELIZ. c4 (1562), children
could be removed from their parents and apprenticed "in such a manner as may render
their abilities in their several stations, of the greatest advantage to the commonwealth."
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (discussing education
under a statutory scheme which included the Statute of Artificers and the Poor Law Act
of 1601, 43 ELIZ. c2 (1601)). In America, the use of the legal system to "improve"
children's lives may have reached its zenith in the 19th century. Armed with their
convictions and a distorted sense ofparenspatriae authority, judges separated children
from impoverished parents without formal determinations of parental unfitness, on the
one hand, or formal determinations that the children had engaged in any criminal activity,
on the other. Such judicial intrusion on family rights and children's lives was endorsed
as "improvement, reformation, wholesome restraint, and protection from depraved
parents or environment." Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae:from Chancery to the
(Vol. 62
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principles, policies and definitions, which dictate a different result. Indeed, the
court not only overlooked concepts of federal constitutional jurisprudence, but
also ignored the precedent of its own decisions. This Article takes the position
that Herndon is fatally deficient in three distinct respects, all related to the courts
failure to harmonize its conclusions with relevant law. First, the Herndon court
failed to apply United States Supreme Court decisions and related Missouri
caselaw to correctly define the constitutional concept of "family."6 Its flawed
handling of this crucial threshold issue lead inexorably to its misapprehension
of family integrity as a limited and limitable right. Second, the Herndon court
failed to identify the proper standard of constitutional review.7 Since the
Hemdons' suit against the Tuheys implicated a single fundamental right, the
Tuheys' right to family integrity, strict judicial scrutiny was required. Instead,
the Herndon court engrafted undue burden test terminology onto its analysis and
improperly applied rational basis review.
Finally, the Herndon court failed to correctly identify the applicable sources
of state power to intrude in family life.8 This failure caused the Herndon court
to misunderstand the relationship between the family and the state established
by the United States Supreme Court. Instead of recognizing that the state lacked
authority to oversee the Tuheys' family life absent a finding of harm or potential
harm to Cody, the Herndon court treated state power as the unbridled authority
to oversee family life and to "better" the lives of children whenever and however
it is moved to do so.9 Had the three concepts of the family in constitutional law,
the appropriate standard of review, and the sources of state authority been
Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 218 (1971) (discussing Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart.
9, 11 (Pa. 1839)); see also Joan C. Bohl, Brave New Statutes; Grandparent Visitation
Statutes as Unconstitutional Invasions of Family Life and Invalid Exercises of State
Power, 3 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 271, 288-98 (1993) (discussing police power,
parenspatriae power, and paternalism in the context of grandparent visitation statutes).
There are, of course, always exceptions. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Turner, 55 111. 280, 286
(1870) ("If without crime... the children of the State are to be thus confined for the
'good of society' then.., free government [had better be] acknowledged a failure.").
6. See supra notes 34-150 and accompanying text.
7. See supra notes 159-211 and accompanying text.
8. See supra notes 257-310 and accompanying text.
9. Justice Woodside summarized this concept in scathing terms thirty-five years
earlier:
If the'better home' test were the only test, public welfare officials could take
children from half the parents in the state whose homes are considered to be
the less desirable and place them in the homes of the other half of the
population considered to have the more desirable homes. Upon extending
this principle further we would find that the family believed to have the best
homes would have the choice of any of our children.
Benson v. Child Welfare Services, 181 A.2d 850, 852 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962).
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accurately understood and properly applied, they would have led to invalidation
of Missouri's grandparent visitation statute on constitutional grounds. Instead,
the Herndon court's conceptual and analytical errors threaten not only the proper
development of grandparent visitation law, but also proper constitutional review
in other contexts where the permissible scope of a state's control over its citizens
is at issue.10
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ann and Randy Tuhey were married in December 1981; their son, Cody,
was born eleven months later." Ann and Randy Tuhey and Ann's parents,
Robert and Sara Herndon, all lived in Marionville, Missouri. 2 The Hemdons
owned an orchard, where Mr. Tuhey worked after his marriage to Ann. 3 During
the time that Mr. Tuhey worked at the orchard, Cody visited the Hemdons both
as a preschooler and later as an elementary school student. 4 After school Cody
would get off the school bus at the Herndons' orchard and stay until his mother
picked him up or his father took him home. 5
Sometime during Mr. Tuhey's seventh year at the orchard, the Hemdons
apparently became dissatisfied with his work, although they never expressed
their dissatisfaction directly to him. 6 Instead, their disapproval apparently took
the form of conflicting instructions causing Mr. Tuhey to feel that no acceptable
alternative existed. "[I]f he followed Mrs. Herndon's orders he was criticized by
Mr. Herndon, and if he followed Mr. Hemdon's orders he was criticized by Mrs.
Herndon." 7 About a year and a half later this inchoate disapproval culminated
in a telephone call from Mrs. Herndon to her daughter, directing Mrs. Tuhey to
tell her husband that he no longer had ajob at the orchard.,8
Shortly after the Hermdons fired Mr. Tuhey, the Tuheys experienced marital
problems and briefly separated. During this period, Cody lived with his mother
and visited his father.' 9 Several months into the separation Cody apparently said
10. See, Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa Baird, Note, Con Law is as Con Law Does:
A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State andFederal Courts, 28 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 971, 1029 (1995) (suggesting that the undue burden test was never intended to
be applied outside the abortion context).
11. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. 1993).
12. Id,
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id,
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 205.
[Vol. 62
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that he did not feel like visiting his father on that particular weekend. 0 Hearing
this, Mrs. Herndon asked if Cody could stay at the orchard for the weekend
instead.2' Mrs. Tuhey declined, explaining the arrangements she and her husband
had made for Cody.22 Later, when Mrs. Tuhey returned to pick up Cody's
bicycle, Mrs. Herndon renewed her objections to the arrangements the Tuheys
had made for their son. An argument ensued, with Mrs. Hemdon "uttering
profanities" about Mr. Tuhey. Mrs. Tuhey, angered, struck Mrs. Hemdon and
left.'
Both Hemdons then drove to Mr. Tuhey's home, apparently arriving while
Mrs. Tuhey was there delivering Cody's bicycle. Mr. Hemdon confronted Mr.
Tuhey, and an altercation involving all four adults ensued.2" Following this
incident, the Tuheys reconciled; the Tuheys and the Hemdons did not. First, the
Herndons sued the Tuheys seeking repayment of money that the Hemdons
loaned to the Tuheys for the purchase of a house." In a second lawsuit, the
Tuheys sought return of cattle they had given to the Hemdons for breeding
purposes.26 Third in the series of lawsuits, the Hemdons sought court ordered
visitation with Cody.27
The trial court rejected the Tuheys' challenge to the constitutionality of
Missouri's grandparent visitation statute and ordered extensive visitation.28 The
Tuheys were to deliver their son to the Hemdons on two Saturdays per month,
'from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The visitation schedule was to be altered several
months later to allow for a longer visit on the third Saturday of each month,
which was to include an overnight visit.29 The trial court also made extensive
provisions for holiday and vacation visitation, and included the requirement that
the Tuheys advise the Hemdons of all of Cody's school activities that the
grandparents reasonably could be expected to attend.30 The Tuheys appealed,
reasserting their constitutional challenge to the grandparent visitation statute
itself."
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 206.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Tuheys also argued that the amount of visitation awarded was
excessive. Id at 210. The court agreed, reversing that aspect of the trial court's decision
and remanding the case for "reassessment of the visitation granted." Id. at 211.
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The Missouri Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Missouri
Supreme Court, -32 noting that "the parents' constitutional attack on the
grandparent visitation statute is substantial and not merely colorable."33 Five
judges of the Missouri Supreme Court joined in a decision rejecting the Tuhey's
constitutional challenge; two judges dissented.
III. FAMILY INTEGRITY RIGHT
The Herndon court's threshold error was its misrepresentation of the family
integrity right as limited and limitable, rather than as the comprehensive right to
autonomy apparent in the historical origins of the concept of the family and in
federal constitutional jurisprudence. The definition of family integrity is a
crucial threshold for the Herndon court's analysis, and for any grandparent
visitation suit, because it is the right at stake for parents and children when
grandparents file suit to override the child rearing decisions of fit parents. If the
right to family integrity is misinterpreted to apply only to certain aspects of
family life and not to others, then a court may find the right does not apply to
court ordered grandparent visitation. If the right to family integrity is
misunderstood as applying only when state intrusion reaches a certain level, then
a court also may conclude that it does not apply to grandparent visitation on a
theory that forced visitation is not significant enough to activate its protections.
The Herndon court committed both of these errors. The Herndon court first
recognized that the United States Supreme Court has found "certain rights"
related to marriage, family relationships, child rearing, and education of children
to be constitutionally protected. 4 It qualified this observation, however, by
noting that the protection is "not absolute;""5 that under "many circumstances"36
state regulation of family life is "proper and not unconstitutional." The Herndon
court noted, as examples, that the state may require school attendance and
prohibit child labor.37 The court failed to explain the logical limits of the family
integrity right, however. Nor does it suggest why the family integrity right might
not apply to the examples cited, leaving the family integrity right in a sort of
analytical limbo. For the Herndon court, the family integrity right has no clear
analytical boundaries and therefore can erect no real barriers against intrusion.
32. The Missouri Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the validity of state statutes. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 3.
33. Hemdon v. Tuhey, No. 17897, 1992 WL 206868, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 26,
1992), affd, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
34. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. 1993).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
[Vol. 62
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Under a second line of reasoning, the Herndon court acknowledged the full
panoply of familial rights articulated by the United States Supreme Court, but
concluded that an award of grandparent visitation is not an intrusion of sufficient
magnitude to implicate any right to family integrity. 8 To accomplish this
legerdemain, the Herndon court first listed cases in which the United States
Supreme Court used the family integrity right to invalidate state action, setting
forth each holding in parentheticals.39 Its list included, for example, the holding
in Santosky v. Kramer' that heightened procedural protection must accompany
permanent termination of parental rights,4' and the Court's conclusion in Stanley
v. Illinois42 that a state law unconstitutionally infringed on an unwed father's
parental rights when it sought to terminate those rights by presuming him unfit.4
3
The court then not only expressly acknowledged that "parents have a
constitutional right to make decisions affecting the family,"' but also conceded
that court-ordered grandparent visitation is an "encroachment"45 and an
"intrusion"46 on family life. The court concluded, nevertheless, that forced
grandparent visitation is constitutionally permissible because it is a smaller
infringement on family life than the intrusions the court has listed.47 The statutes
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court, the Herndon court noted,
contemplate "complete and permanent" intrusions."
The fallacy of the Herndon courfs conclusion is immediately evident in its
conspicuous failure to suggest exactly how one is to distinguish between an
intrusion which is great and therefore of constitutional significance and one
which is small and therefore of insignificant magnitude. Indeed, the
infringement on family life in some of the cases Herndon cited as examples of
major intrusions seem indistinguishable from the infringement on family life
caused by court-ordered grandparent visitation. In Meyer v. Nebraska,49 Pierce
38. Id. at 207-08.
39. Id.
40. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
41. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. 1993) (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
42. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
43. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972)).
44. Id. at 208.
45. Id. at 209.
46. Id. at 210.
47. Id. at 209.
48. Id.
49. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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v. Society of Sisters,s° and Wisconsin v. Yoder,5 for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court found state education laws unconstitutional where those laws infringed
upon a parent's right to direct his or her child's education and to oversee the
child's experiences and upbringing generally. 2 In Meyer, the state sought to
ensure children a thorough grounding in the English language by prohibiting
instruction in any modem foreign language until the child finished eighth
grade. 3 In Pierce, the state sought to compel attendance in public as opposed
to private schools.54 In Yoder, the state sought to compel Amish children to
attend public school until they were sixteen." In each case, the Court found the
laws in question impermissible because each diverted some of the responsibility
for the child's upbringing away from its proper source in the parents.56 Similarly,
when a court imposes grandparent visitation, the parents loose the right to decide
with whom their child will spend time, and how that time will be spent." Like
50. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
51. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
52. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-
35.
53. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
54. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
55. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
56. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 ("No emergency has arisen which [justifies state
limitation on teaching of modem foreign languages] with the consequent infringement
of rights long freely enjoyed."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (law prohibiting attendance
at private or parochial schools "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Yoder,
406 U.S. at 232, 234 (law requiring Amish children to attend school until age 16 violated
'the "the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State to guide the
religious future and education of their children").
57. Sometimes this interference is direct and explicit. In Hawk v. Hawk, for
example, the parents wished to be the only ones to physically discipline their children
and wanted to be consulted regarding the children's activities and bedtimes when the
children were in the company of their grandparents. At trial, the judge not only awarded
the grandparents extensive, unsupervised visitation but commented:
[T]he grandparents don't have to answer to anybody when they have the
children. They can take the children to visit friends of theirs, they can have
friends in to visit with the children. They can take the children anywhere they
please .... [T]hey're not restricted as to where they can take them, because
the court is fully convinced that they would not do anything or take these
children anywhere that would adversely affect these children.
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn. 1993).
At other times the interference is simply implicit in the visitation award since it
removes children from their parents' custody and control:
Some parents and judges will not care if children are physically disciplined
by the grandparents; some parents and judges will not care if the grandparents
[Vol. 62
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the parents in Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, the Tuhey's lost some of their right "to
direct the upbringing and education of [their] children."5
These logical difficulties with the court's position aside, the fundamental
flaw in the courVs conclusion lies in its failure to understand family integrity as
a comprehensive set of rights rooted in the historical tradition of family life59 as
a "private realm... the state cannot enter."' In the writings of Lord Coke, for
example, the relationship between members of the family fundamentally is
teach children a religion inconsistent with the parents' religion; some judges
and parents will not care if the children are exposed to or taught racist beliefs
or sexist beliefs; .... But some parents and some judges will care. Between
the two, the parents should be the ones to choose not to expose their children
to certain people or ideas ....
King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Ky.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992) (Lambert,
J., dissenting) (citing Kathleen Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?,
24 J. FAM. L. 393 (1985)).
58. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
59. The nature of the family integrity right, like any constitutional right, must be
understood through examination of history and tradition; "the due process clause protects
only those interests so rooted in the traditions and conscience as to be ranked as
fundamental." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989). This is a practical
necessity in our legal system: by identifying the history, tradition and rationale for
protecting a given right as specifically as possible, at least as a point of reference, the
Court adheres to the concept of a legal system which relies on the rule of law rather than
depending on the predilections of the particular decision maker. Id. at 127 n.6. Indeed,
the Court has cautioned that it becomes "most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 194 (1985). In some circumstances, discerning the role of history and
tradition in the evolution of a right or interest may be complex and subject to debate. In
Grisivoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for example, the Court was faced with a
law which prohibited the use of contraceptives by married women, a phenomenon which
obviously had no direct analog at common law.
Although agreeing that the law was unconstitutional, the majority and each of the
three concurrences differed on the exact role of history and tradition in the analysis. No
such difficulty arises in the present context. Although the legal relationship of men and
women may have changed over time, the fact that history and tradition respected the
unitary family as the basis of civil society and shielded it from governmental interference
has not. Similarly, although societal changes may have extended the lives of
grandparents and increased their social role beyond any circumstance Kent and
Blackstone could have imagined, grandparents themselves are not a new phenomenon.
The process of using history and tradition as a point of reference in the analysis of
grandparent visitation cases is thus a straightforward process of identifying the
boundaries of families as established by history and tradition, the defining characteristics
of the interface of family and state.
60. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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governed not by statutory law but by common law,6' and thus by the "order and
course of nature."'62 The resulting conception of the family is of a self-contained
unit, independent of state control and so wholly reciprocal that parents and
children "may maintain the suits of each other, and justify the defense of each
other's person."63
In commentaries written a little over a hundred years after those of Lord
Coke, Sir William Blackstone echoed this conception of family life as a
comprehensive set of mutual obligations and benefits running between parents
and children "founded in nature"' rather than civil society. According to
Blackstone, parents maintain,65 protect" and educate67 their children. For their
part, children owe duties to their parents corresponding to the benefits they
receive. Before emancipation, children owe their parents obedience and
subjection,68 just as parents owe children appropriate guidance and education.69
During their minority, children also owe their father the benefits of their labors
as long as they live in the father's home and are maintained by him. This
obligation, too, is tempered by reciprocal parental considerations, for although
a father receives the profits during the children's minority, he has to account for
them when the children come of age.70
The archetypal family emanating from common law tradition-the nuclear
family-thus is self-goveming through reciprocal obligations among its
members. The concept of family life that animates American constitutional
jurisprudence, therefore, is, first, that a family consists of a husband, a wife, and
their children. Second, as long as this primary unit is functional, it is self
governing-a "private realm" insulated from state oversight or control.
Not all groups claiming familial status conform to the archetype of
Blackstone's day, however,7' and the characteristics of family life which the
61. LORD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 11 (1628).
62. Id. at 12.
63. SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 109 n.9 (2d ed. 1836) (citations omitted).
64. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 410 (1 st
ed. 1979) (1765).
65. lid at 439.
66. 1 id.
67. 1 id Blackstone reasoned that a parent confers no "benefit upon his child by
bringing him into the world ... if he afterwards entirely neglects his culture and
education and suffers him to grow up like a mere beast." I id.
68. 1 id at 441.
69. 1 id. at 438.
70. 1 id at 441.
71. Modem circumstances affecting families may differ from any analog of
Blackstone's time. At common law, for example, state actions to terminate parental rights
[Vol. 62
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Court has isolated to address the familial rights of disparate groups of co-
habitants further illuminate the scope of the family integrity right. Generally,
these factors are considered: first, a finding that the members of the familial
group were brought together by private commitments rather than by operation
of law, second, the existence of a biological relationship between some members
of the group, and third, close and ongoing relationships among members,
reflecting the fact that the importance of family life lies in "the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association."72 Collectively
these characteristics are important to the present analysis because they highlight
the essence of the modem relationship between family and state, and, thus, the
error of the Herndon court's conclusion that government may intrude on
decisions made by fit parents for their child within the context of a family
relationship.
The first characteristic of a family is that it must consist of a group of
people who have made a personal decision to live together for mutual economic
and social support. In Moore v. East Cleveland,73 for example, appellant Moore
challenged the validity of an ordinance which defined "family" so narrowly that
she could not live with her son and two grandsons who were first cousins rather
than brothers.7 4 Invalidating the ordinance as an impermissible intrusion into the
protected area of family life, the Court noted that Moore, her son, and her
grandsons had made a personal commitment7 to unite in a single household for
mutual sustenance and to share "the duties and satisfactions of a common
home. 7
6
In contrast, the Court found an indispensable characteristic of family life
missing when the group seeking familial status was both initiated by operation
of state law rather than voluntary association, and remained under continuous
state regulation. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform," ("OFFER"), foster parents argued that the psychological ties created
were unknown, Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 229 (1971), as were formal adoptions, divorce or remarriage,
LAWRENCE STONE, BROKEN LIVES: SEPARATION AND DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 1660-1857,
at 18 (1993).
72. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform [hereinafter
OFFER], 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
73. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
74. Id. at 496.
75. The Court applied the same reasoning to reach a contrary conclusion in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), when it declined to find that a group of six
unrelated students acquired familial status simply by living together for convenience in
a rented house.
76. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505.
77. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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with the foster children placed in their homes should confer upon the unit thus
created the status of "psychological family," with the attendant constitutional
protections accorded to families.7" Rejecting the foster parents' argument, the
Court held that emotional bonds created within a foster family are inherently
different from the bonds between parent and child since foster care is "an
arrangement in which the State has been a partner from the outset."79 The Court
noted the unitary family arises from the personal commitment of individuals and
lies "entirely apart from the power of the State;"80 the familial interest the foster
parents sought to assert, on the other hand, "derives from a knowingly assumed
contractual relation with the State"'" and must be ascertained from state law,82
not from the history and tradition which informs our understanding of the natural
family.
Indeed, the absence of state oversight with regard to the details of family
life is an indispensable characteristic of the family even when the group upon
which oversight is imposed could continue to carry out other typically familial
activities. In Stanley v. fllinois,83 for example, an unwed father challenged a
state law which, in pertinent part, defined "patent" as "the father and mother of
a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an
illegitimate child."84 The father, Stanley, had lived with his children and their
mother for eighteen years. Upon the mother's death, Stanley's children were
declared wards of the state and removed from Stanley's home on the theory that,
as an unwed father, he was not a "legal parent" under state law.
The Court first rejected the state's theory that any detriment Stanley suffered
was not legally cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment since Stanley could
have petitioned the court for "custody and control" of the children. The Court
observed that even apart from the illogic of suggesting that an unmarried father
"without funds and already once presumed unfit"8 5 could prevail on such a
petition, legal guardianship is not equivalent to the status of a parent. As a legal
guardian, Stanley would be subject to continuing judicial supervision. A state
court could require him to report on his handling of the children's affairs,86 for
example, and in the event that his judgment were found wanting, the court could
remove him as guardian without the procedural protections available to a parent
78. Id. at 839.
79. Id. at 845.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
84. Id. at 647, 650 n.4.
85. Id. at 648.
86. Id. at 649.
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in a neglect proceeding. 7 The distinction for the Court was, thus, the loss of
autonomy and the issue of state control. If the state had become a silent partner
in the lives of Stanley and his children, no family really could have existed at all.
State intrusion into family life is not merely inconsistent with the concept of a
family as a private sphere of life, it is literally contrary to a definition of the
family itself.
As Stanley itself suggests, a second familial characteristic the Court has
identified is the presence of some blood relationship between some members of
a household. Thus, some of Stanley's familial rights arose from the fact that the
state sought to separate him from the children he had "sired"88 as well as
"raised." 9  Similarly, Moore's household acquired some constitutionally
significant familial status in part because of the degree to which its members
were related." For the court's purposes, however, the familial characteristic of
a blood relationship is as important for what it does not signify as for what it
does signify, for the fact that Moore was a grandparent, as opposed to any other
relative, had no particular significance.9' Although the Court noted Moore's
relationship to the children, it made no distinction between grandparents and any
other relatives92 who draw together to "participate in the duties and the
satisfactions of a common home."93 The Court's focus was on the family-like
function of the household and the "mutual sustenance"'94 it provides.
The Court's functional analysis of Moore's household illustrates the third
and final factor the Court has identified as characteristic of a family: for the
Court, the existence of relationships arising from the "intimacy of daily
87. Id at 648-49.
88. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
89. Id.
90. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99, 504 (1997).
91. Herndon's parenthetical description of the Court's holding in Moore suggests
that Herndon misinterpreted Moore as signifying the Court's willingness to expand the
constitutional definition of "family" to include grandparents. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857
S.W.2d 203, 207 (Mo. 1993) (suggesting that Moore represents "strong tradition and
recognition of the extended family"). Herndon is not alone in this misinterpretation of
Moore. See, e.g., Grandparents: The Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Services of the House of Representatives Select
Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1982) (statement of Judith Areen, Professor
of Law and Professor of Community and Family Medicine, Georgetown University,
Georgetown University Medical Center); Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional
Constraints on Grandparent Visitation Statutes, 86 COLum. L. REv. 118, 129, 132
(1986).
92. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
93. Id. at 505.
94. Id.
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association"9 is the pivotal characteristic of a family. Moore's household was
most fundamentally family-like because of the ongoing and interdependent
relationships within it and because it demonstrated the shared lives of a single
household. The Court noted, for example, that Moore's grandson, John, lost his
mother and came to live with his grandmother to provide a "substitute for his
mother's care."'96 The concurring opinion noted that the grandsons had, in
essence, a "sibling" relationship, and that John's relationship with Moore was
"the only maternal influence he had during his entire life."97 The minutiae of
daily life which constitute the relationships from which a family is formed are
both the defining aspect of the family and the aspect of fanmily life to which
constitutional protections attach.98
The Herndon court erred, therefore, in failing to recognize that the family
integrity right fully protected the Tuheys' right to live together without state
intrusion on their decisions as fit parents. Like Stanley and his children, the
Tuheys were entitled to live without judicial second guessing of their parenting
decisions. The state oversight of family life implicit in a grandparent visitation
award, like the state oversight postulated in Stanley, is simply incompatible with
family life. Furthermore, the parenting decision countermanded by the
grandparent visitation award was part of the constellation of relationships and
concerns, plans and promises that collectively made the Tuheys parents, rather
than some sort of hired hands contracting with the state like a foster family to
provide child rearing services for Cody.
This emphasis on defining the family through ongoing relationships within
a single household, and on granting constitutional protection to such
relationships once they take shape, is nowhere clearer than in a synthesis of the
four cases the Supreme Court has heard regarding the rights of unwed fathers.
In two of the cases, the unwed fathers seeking to assert familial rights had lived
with their children in common households for periods of time and had otherwise
maintained active parent-child relationships;' in the two other cases, the fathers
had not."°  The presence or absence of a strong and ongoing parental
95. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977).
96. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 n.16.
97. Id. at 506 n.2 (Brennan, J. concurring).
98. Although it declined to find that the relationship between a foster parent and
foster child was entitled to the full protection of the family integrity right, the Court
expressly affirmed the constitutional significance of daily contact between a child and
a caretaker in Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 844. Since the foster care system entrusts the
daily care of a child to foster parents, the Court reasoned that over time the daily contact
would render the foster family functionally the equivalent of a natural family. Id.
99. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
100. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
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relationship was so crucial to the Court's analysis that the outcome of each case
expressly rested on that factor."0 '
In the first case, Stanley, an unwed father who had lived with his children
for their whole lives 10 2 argued that the family integrity right should protect his
relationship with his children despite a state statute which defined "parent" to
exclude unwed fathers.1'0 Affirming the right of Stanley and his children to be
free of state intrusion in their family life, the Court held that the family integrity
right protects the bond between a man and the children he has "sired and
raised."' The Court stressed the relational nature of family rights by noting that
the state statute in question actually invaded an intact family to separate a father
from his children.1
0 5
In Caban v. Mohammed,"° the Court again affirmed the constitutional
significance of family relationships by recognizing a constitutionally significant
parental right where a father who no longer lived with his children nevertheless
managed to maintain a consistent, if clandestine relationship with them. Caban
initially lived with his children and their mother, provided support, and
participated in their upbringing. Caban's situation differed from Stanley's
however, in that the children's mother moved out, taking the children with her.
Through his own mother and mother-in-law, Caban managed to continue an
active parental relationship with his children, a relationship of which the
children's mother was completely unaware. 7 When the mother's new husband
initiated adoption proceedings, Caban tried unsuccessfully to block the adoption
in state court. He ultimately prevailed, however, in the United States Supreme
Court; the Court specifically found that Caban had a "substantial" parental
relationship with his children0 8 which gave rise to constitutionally protected
(1978).
101. Indeed, the Court was unmoved by allegations that the mother of one child
had thwarted the father by hiding the child, Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (White, J., dissenting),
and rejected arguments that a bi6logical connection coupled with desire for contact
should serve as a basis for access to the children in question.
102. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646, 650 n.4 (the custody of two of Stanley's children was
at issue).
103. Stanley made an equal protection argument: since the right to family integrity
protects the relationship between married parents and their children absent a showing of
unfitness, his relationship with his children was entitled to the same protection. Stanley,
405 U.S. at 646-47.
104. Id. at 651.
105. Id. at 652-53 (noting that the issue at stake for Stanley was "the
dismemberment of his family").
106. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
107. Id. at 383.
108. Id. at 388.
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family rights. The Court noted that since Caban had lived with his children and
maintained a close relationship thereafter, "[t]here was no reason to believe that
the Caban children-aged 4 and 6 at the time of the adoption proceedings-had
a relationship with their mother unrivaled by the affection and concem of their
father."'0 9 The fact that Caban's arrangements to see his children had been
clandestine did not affect the Court's conclusion at all; the existence of a parent-
child relationship was the defining factor."0
The Court's reasoning in the two cases in which the unwed biological
fathers could not show a substantial parental relationship demonstrated that the
Court will not entertain any other basis for familial rights."' In both Quilloin v.
Walcott"' and Lehr v. Robertson,"' the unwed fathers tried to block"4 or
invalidate" 5 their children's adoption by the new husband of each child's
biological mother. In each case, the child in question was integrated into a new
family consisting of his biological mother and her new husband; neither child
had ever lived with his biological father. In each case, the unwed father tried,
in effect, to challenge the teaching of Stanley, amplified in Caban, that family
rights arise from and protect the ongoing responsibility of parent for child and
the reciprocal relationship thus engendered. In each case, the biological father
took the position that although he had no actual parental relationship with his
child on which constitutional protection could be premised, the Court should
109. Id. at 389.
110. Id. at 389 n.7, 393 n.14.
111. The Court had occasion to address directly the significance of the genetic
connection between putative father and child in Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
Respondent Minnich, the mother of a newborn child, successfully alleged that petitioner
Rivera was the father of her child and was awarded child support. The state supreme
court upheld the unanimous jury award in her favor; Rivera petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court for review. Rivera argued that the higher burden of proof required to terminate the
parent-child relationship under Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), should be
constitutionally required in a paternity determination that could create a parent-child
relationship. Rejecting his argument, a seven-justice majority held that the
constitutionally protected aspects of the parent-child relationship arose from an actual
relationship. Rivera, 483 U.S. at 579-80. The Rivera court, quoting Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983), stated "[t]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection." Rivera, 483 U.S. at 580 n.7. In fact, the Court
noted the "nonadmission of paternity" was "a disavowal of any interest in providing the
training, nurture and loving protection that are at the heart of the parental relationship
protected by the Constitution." Id. at 580.
112. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
113. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
114. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
115. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.
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give constitutional protection to his potential relationship with his child." 6 The
Court's characterization of family rights as relational foreclosed both fathers'
claims. For the Court, where no relationship exists, there is nothing to protect" 7
Rejecting Quilloin's claim, for example, the Court pointed out that Quilloin had
"never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision,
education, protection, or care of the child.""' The Court rejected Lehr's claim
on the same theory, even in the face of evidence that the child's mother had
thwarted Lehr's attempts to establish a relationship with the child by moving
frequently and keeping her new addresses secret." 9 Whatever the perceived
unfairness of denying familial rights to one who would have been willing to
actively parent a child, the rule is clear. Familial rights are the reciprocal rights
of parents and children to continue the ongoing relationships of a common home
without state interference.
Missouri case law is consistent with this conception of family rights as
comprehensive rights, arising out of and protecting the reciprocal obligations and
ongoing relationships of members within a household. In Ellis v. Northwest
Missouri Juvenile Council, Inc. 2 ' and Vinita Park v. Girls Sheltercare, Inc.,' 2'
for example, group homes for juveniles adjudged neglected or in need of
supervision were proposed in residential neighborhoods zoned for single family
use." The respective neighbors of each group home challenged establishment
of the homes on the ground that groups of unrelated minors under the
supervision of resident professionals could not constitute "families."
Rejecting the neighbors' arguments, the court in each case noted that the
proposed size of each group fell generally within the objective specifications set
by the zoning ordinance,12 4 and that the groups conformed to the "broad and
primary sense" of family rooted in common law tradition.'25 Each group was
intended to "approximate a single family setting,"'126 with the members assuming
"reciprocal natural or moral duties to support and care for each other."' 27 The
116. Id at 255; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253.
117. See Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987), discussed supra note 104.
118. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
119. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249-50 (White, J., dissenting).
120. 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
121. 664 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
122. Ellis, 520 S.W.2d at 645; Vanita Park, 664 S.W.2d at 258.
123. Ellis, 520 S.W.2d at 646-47; Vanita Park, 664 S.W.2d at 259.
124. Ellis, 520 S.W.2d at 650-51; Vanita Park, 664 S.W.2d at 259.
125. Ellis, 520 S.W.2d at 650; accord Vanita Park, 664 S.W.2d at 259.
126. Vanita Park, 664 S.W.2d at 259.
127. Ellis, 520 S.W.2d at 650 (quoting Steva v. Steva, 332 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Mo.
1960)).
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private relationships planned within each group home as "substitutes for
[parents'] care" ' made each as essentially family-like as the "common home"
of grandmother and grandsons'29 protected in Moore.
Missouri courts also applied this definition of family in the'context of
probate law. In Steva v. Steva,30 the plaintiff filed a claim against her brother-in-
law's estate for the reasonable value of cleaning and housekeeping services
provided to him while he lived near her home.' The estate disputed her claim,
arguing that a "family relationship" existed between the plaintiff and the
deceased, and the plaintiff was therefore presumed to have provided all services
for nothing.'32 Rejecting the estate's argument, the court noted that the plaintiff
and her brother-in-law could not be considered "family" since they did not live
in one household, under "one domestic government" with "reciprocal natural or
moral duties to support and care for each other."'3 Similarly, in Sturgeon v.
Estate of Wideman' the court concluded that the plaintiff stated a valid claim
against her deceased mother's estate for services rendered because, although the
mother had actually lived in the plaintiffs house, the evidence showed that the
mother was incapable of providing the "mutual services" or assuming the
"reciprocal duties" essential to any definition of family.'35
A Missouri grandparent visitation case, which apparently escaped the
attention of the Herndon court, helps to establish the fact that these reciprocal
obligations give rise to a "private realm"'36 upon which the state may not intrude.
In Aegerter v. Thompson,'37 a child's paternal grandparents petitioned for
visitation with their grandchild after the grandchild was adopted by their former
daughter-in-law's new husband. Rejecting the grandparents' petition,' the court
noted that the child was now part of a new family. Not only was she no longer
the child of divorced parents and a deceased father, but her new parents were
totally responsible for her welfare and for the direction of her life. With this
responsibility, the court concluded, should come full authority to determine her
best interests without intrusion from those who were now strangers to the
128. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 n.16 (1997).
129. Id. at 505.
130. 332 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1960).
131. Id. at 925.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 926-27.
134. 608 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
135. Id. at 142.
136. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
137. 610 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
138. The court noted that even prior to the adoption the grandparents had only an
inchoate right to reasonable visitation with their grandchild based on her parents' divorce
and the father's death. Id. at 310.
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family. 39 Indeed, all Missouri cases addressing the welfare of children correctly
recognize family privacy as a threshold bar to state intervention. 4 Under
Missouri law the state reaches any consideration of the best interests of the child
only after some harm or threat of harm is demonstrated. 4 ' The right and
obligation of parents to keep custody of their children, providing for their
material and moral needs, is "a fundamental concept of our society"'42 in the eyes
of the Missouri judicial system as well as in federal constitutional jurisprudence.
A Missouri case addressing the rights of an unwed father suggests that
Missouri may extend even greater protection to family integrity than that
accorded to the family by common law tradition and United States Supreme
Court cases. In J.D.S. v. Edwards,43 the child's biological father asserted his
parental rights, attempting to block transfer of guardianship of the child to the
state division of Family Services after the mother's parental rights were
terminated. Missouri law provided, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the court
terminate(s) the parental rights of both parents (or) of the mother if the child is
illegitimate ... it may transfer the guardianship and legal custody of the child to
... the state division of welfare (now the Division of Family Services)."' 44
Applying the United States Supreme Court's holding in Stanley v. Illinois, the
court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional to the extent that it
permitted severance of all parental rights to an illegitimate child by terminating
the mother's rights only. 41 In deciding upon the proper standard to apply to a
determination of an unwed father's substantive rights, however, the Missouri
Supreme Court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Quilloin. Noting that Quilloin allowed a best interests of the child determination
to extinguish an unwed father's parental rights where the child had never lived
with him and had been part of a new family unit for a substantial period of time,
the court held that the Missouri Constitution forbade such a dilution of familial
139. Id
140. See, e.g., State v. Couch, 294 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (holding
that parental autonomy is a fundamental concept of our society limited only where the
child requires piotection).
141. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2 (1)-(3) (1994) (providing that statutory
grounds for termination of parental rights include, inter alia, abandonment of the child,
abuse, neglect and parental inability to provide necessary care); In re T.S., 925 S.W.2d
486, 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a court may reach the issue of the best
interests of the child only after one or more of the statutory grounds have been met); In
re M.H., 859 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (same).
142. State v. Couch, 294 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
143. 574 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1978).
144. Edwards, 574 S.W.2d at 407-08.
145. Id. at 408.
19
Bohl: Bohl: Family Autonomy vs. Grandparent Visitation:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
rights. 4 6 Instead, the court concluded that after a "reasonable showing of
fatherly concern," an unwed father was entitled to the same presumption of
fitness accorded to married fathers.'47
Under Missouri law as well as federal law, then, a "family" is typically the
nuclear unit of parent and children characterized by reciprocal relationships
arising from a shared life. The grandparent who does not live in the same
household and under the same "domestic government" cannot be considered part
of the family. The rights attaching to the family unit are the logical corollaries
of its fundamental characteristics. Family members have the right to maintain
their relationships with each other free of state interference or oversight. Parents
have a right to make decisions concerning their children's education and
experiences; children have a right to have those decisions made by their parents,
as the people most committed to their welfare.'48
Since these relationships necessarily involve all aspects of life, all are
embraced by the family integrity right. Because the family integrity right
protects the Tuheys, as fit parents, in all child rearing decisions, no independent
best interests of the child analysis may be undertaken. Under Missouri law,'49
as well as federal constitutional theories, 50 the state may not substitute its
judgment for the judgment of fit parents. There is thus no basis for concluding,
as the Herndon court did, that some family rights are somehow different in
nature from others and thus outside the reach of the family integrity right.
Similarly, any state intrusion on these rights is constitutionally cognizable; none
can be said to be of insufficient magnitude. The Herndon court's failure to apply
the family integrity right to invalidate the visitation award made against the
wishes of the Tuheys is legally unsustainable.
Clues to the real basis for the Herndon court's flawed conclusions regarding
the family integrity right can be found in the incidental phrases and word choices
in the majority opinion and in the explication provided by the dissent. The
majority opinion begins with the statement, "Cody Christopher Tuhey, age ten,
146. Id. at 409.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S, 678, 684-85 (1977)
(holding that the right of personal privacy includes "the interest in independence" in
making decisions "relating to marriage; procreation; contraception; family relationships
and child rearing and education"); Jan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child
Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 806 (1985) (noting that "the Constitution surely
reserves to the people the right to decide for themselves how to try to maximize the
development of their own children-whether by having a home life that emphasizes human
affection, or academic skills, or religion, or cultural affinity, or materialism, or other
values").
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descended from strong, proud stock."'' Perhaps most obviously this is a
statement of sentiment rather than fact or law. It is irrelevant to the matter before
the court and so suggests that sentiment replaced precedent in the court's
decision-making process. 5 2 It also suggests, however, that from the very
beginning the court was substituting a convenient, lay concept of "family" for the
constitutionally required definition founded in history and tradition. To analyze
the intrusion occasioned by grandparent visitation accurately the court had to
correctly conceptualize the family integrity right and the parameters of the group
it protects. A definition disposed to include an undefined and unlimited
collection of ancestors necessarily produced an inaccurate understanding of
family integrity.
When the court described the factual basis of the suit, the nature of its
misunderstanding became clearer. The parties' different surnames would have
allowed the court to refer to all adults as "Mr." or "Mrs." without possibility of
confusion: Mr. Hemdon, Mr. Tuhey, Mrs. Herndon, Mrs. Tuhey. The court
nevertheless chose to refer to the grandparents with honorifics and surnames and
to Cody and his parents by their first names,' as though the parents still had the
subordinate status of children in what the court unconsciously regarded as a
single "family," with the grandparents at the head. 54
151. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Mo. 1993).
152. Readers who find this assessment unnecessarily harsh should note that in
areas of law not usually subject to sentiment, shareholder derivative suits for example,
opinions typically begin with statements of relevant fact, or of the procedural posture of
the case, not with legal irrelevancies like "love of money is the root of all evil."
153. See, e.g., Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 205 ("Mr. Herndon," "Mrs. Herndon,"
"Randy," "Ann").
154. The close connection between specific word choices and the speaker's own
perspective has been well documented and applied in a variety of contexts. Linguists
have long recognized the "close connection between the way we talk about something
and the way we regard it. The language we use about it betrays our views on what it is."
S. PIT CORDER, INTRODUCING APPLIED LINGUISTICS 19 (1973).
Indeed, capitalizing on this close connection between word and thought, activists
in the 1980's urged journalists and scholars to refer to street people as "homeless" rather
than calling them "drifters" or "beggars." By the mid 1980's widespread use of the term
"homeless" helped engender more empathy for street people. Robert C. Ellickson,
Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows and Public
Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192 (1996). And of course every student of trial
advocacy knows that "labels," the way one refers to "parties, events and other important
things during the trial .... are important because they convey attitudes and messages."
THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 46 (1992).
Finally, two Missouri appellate court cases illustrate alternate ways of indicating
the parties in cases involving parents, grandparents and children. In Aegerter v.
Thompson the court referred to the grandparents as "appellants," the parents by their full
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The dissent's criticism of the majority's assessment of the intrusion involved
perhaps most clearly demonstrates the source of the majority's errors.
Discussing the grandparent visitation approved by the majority, Judge Covington
described the level of intrusion as "far from insignificant," noting that "allowing
the government to force upon an unwilling family a third party even when the
third party happens to be a grandparent, is a significant intrusion into the
integral family unit."'55 This is, of course, exactly what the majority did; it
expressly endorsed the significant forcible invasion of a functional family over
the united objections of fit parents. Equally clear, however, is the fact that this
is not at all what the majority thought its opinion did. For example, the majority
first carefully reviewed the United States Supreme Court's family integrity cases,
purported to compare the intrusions described to the intrusions of grandparent
visitation, and concluded that grandparent visitation is a "less than substantial
encroachment of a family."'56 The majority then commented on the rationale for
a grandparent visitation statute:
One of [its] main purposes ... is to prevent a family quarrel of little
significance to [sic] disrupt a relationship which should be encouraged rather
than destroyed.
[I]t is not unreasonable for the state to say that the development of a loving
relationship between family members is desirable .... 57
Its reference to family integrity cases notwithstanding, the court obviously was
not referring to the relationship between Mr. and Mrs. Tuhey when it referred to
a "family" quarrel. At this point, the majority was no longer treating the issue
of grandparent visitation as an issue of family autonomy for parents and child;
the identities of the litigants had become blurred. At some points in its
discussion, the majority properly treated parents and children as the "family"; at
other points, the meaning of the word "family" changed as the court implicitly
redrew the boundaries of the family unit to include grandparents.,58 The
names and the child by her first name alone. Aegerter v. Thompson, 610 S.W.2d 308,
309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). In Farrell v. Denson the court refers to the parties as
"grandmother," "mother," and "children." Farrell v. Denson, 821 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1991).
155. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 212 (Covington, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
156. Id. at 209.
157. Id. at 209-10.
158. Compare the following two excerpts: (1) "The Tuheys [parents] contend that
they have a constitutional right to raise their children as they see fit, free from state
intrusion .... Of course this constitutional right is not absolute."; (2) "There is no reason
a petty dispute between a father [referring to the plaintiff] and son [referring to the
defendant] should be allowed to deprive a grandparent and grandchild of the unique
[Vol. 62
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majority seems to have been unaware that these shifts had occurred, much less
able to acknowledge these shifts had dictated the court's result. They are neither
legally defensible nor, apparently, the product of conscious thought.
Despite its use of family integrity terminology and its citations to United
States Supreme Court cases, the Herndon court made no actual comparison
between government intrusions on family life, which the Court has held violate
the right of familial privacy, and a grandparent visitation suit. Instead, the
Herndon court unthinkingly confused the constitutional concept of "family" with
a vague, lay definition; grandparents are unstated quasi-family members. Since
the Herndon court perceived grandparents already to be included in the family
unit, it perceived the "magnitude of the intrusion" as minor indeed.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Herndon court erred in limiting its review of the grandparent visitation
statute to an examination of whether the statute bore a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose. Since the Tuheys' right to family integrity was the
single fundamental right at stake, strict scrutiny rather than rational basis review
was necessary.
The Herndon court compounded the error of engaging in rational basis
review by asserting that it can be justified under an undue burden analysis. This
odd attempt to import Justice O'Connor's balancing test from the abortion
context, where competing rights of constitutional magnitude must be reconciled,
fails on logical as well as legal grounds. In a grandparent visitation suit, no
second right exists against which family integrity can or should be balanced.
Further, the Herndon court did not engage in genuine rational basis review,
and did not establish a rational basis for the statute even under the most lenient
incarnation of the test. The court failed to suggest any rational connection
between the statute and a legitimate state goal-or even a connection between the
statute and the policy it purports to further.
Finally, the Herndon court's rational basis review of the grandparent
visitation statute before it lacks legitimacy, not only because it is contrary to
constitutional principles established in United States Supreme Court decisions,
but also because it conflicts with those principles as articulated in settled
Missouri law.
The Herndon court justified its use of rational basis review by first
acknowledging the line of United States Supreme Court cases affirming a
constitutional right to privacy in family life, but without describing the specific
relationship that ordinarily exists between these individuals. One of the main purposes
of the statute is to prevent afamily quarrel of little significance to disrupt a relationship
which should be encouraged rather than destroyed." Id. at 207-09 (emphasis supplied).
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right at issue. 9 Then, describing this right as "not absolute" and, therefore,
limitable, provided state infringement upon family life is below a certain
"magnitude," the Herndon court quoted dicta in Zablocki v. Redhail'" which
purports to allow state regulation to intrude upon the family's right to privacy
when the intrusion is minimal.
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not
mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the
incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous
scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately
be imposed.'6'
This attempt to legitimize forced grandparent visitation as a constitutionally
acceptable intrusion on family life, because it is a minimal one, is doomed,
however, for the Herndon court's use of Zablocki misconstrued the distinction
between types of regulation central to the Zablocki analysis.
In Zablocki, appellant Redhail successfully challenged a state statute which
prevented the noncustodial parents of minor children from marrying unless they
could demonstrate not only that all support obligations had been met but also that
the children covered by support orders "[were] not then and [were] not likely
thereafter to become public charges."' 62 When he was an unemployed minor,
appellant Redhail had fathered a child and had admitted paternity. As a result,
he had been subject to an order to pay child support. 6 The order had gone
largely unsatisfied"' since the child's infancy. Appellant Redhail subsequently
wished to marry, and, as he pointed out to the Court, the challenged statute
prevented him from doing so, either in his home state or in any other. 6 In light
of the fundamental status of the right to marry,'66 it is hardly surprising that the
Court invalidated the statute as a virtually complete prohibition of marriage as
applied to individuals such as the appellant.6 Indeed, for present purposes, the
159. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207-08.
160. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
161. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 208 (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386).
162. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
163. Id. at 377-78.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 376.
166. Id. at 374 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
167. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387. Although appellant had argued that the statute was
violative of his rights under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the majority invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds.
Id. at 377, 387.
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significance of the Court's decision lies not in its rejection of what amounted to
a statutory ban on certain marriages, but in the precise nature of that interference
as contrasted with the interference the Court addressed in the companion case of
Califano v. Jobst.'68
Unlike the statute challenged in Zablocki, the Court noted that the
legislation at issue in Jobst was permissible because it placed no "direct legal
obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married.""6 9 In Jobst, petitioner
Jobst unsuccessfully challenged provisions of the Social Security Act which
specified that certain benefits he received as a result of his dependent disabled
child classification 70 were automatically terminated since he had married a
woman not entitled to benefits under the Act, even though his new wife was also
permanently disabled.' Comparing Jobst's circumstances with those at issue
in Zablocki, the Zablocki Court noted that Jobst was able to marry despite the
challenged provision; although he lost $20 per month in benefits,' no aspect of
the protected activity of deciding to marry and establish a family was directly
affected at all.'
The distinction made in Zablocki thus is not as the Herndon court
represented it. It is not a distinction between legislation having a greater or
lesser impact on a fundamental right, but rather a distinction between legislation
which affects a constitutionally protected right directly as opposed to legislation
which does not. Since a fit parents right to make child rearing decisions is both
the constitutionally protected activity itself and the protected activity upon which
a grandparent visitation award directly intrudes, grandparent visitation statutes
are conceptually identical to the legislation which Zablocki found impermissible.
Indeed, not only is the Herndon court's use of Zablocki completely
inconsistent with Zabloclils actual holding, it is also inconsistent with the
Missouri Supreme Court's own correct use of Zablocki in earlier decisions. In
168. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
169. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12.
170, Jobst, 434 U.S. at 48.
171. Id.
172. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 57 n.17.
173. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12. In finding the regulation constitutionally.
permissible the Court noted that petitioner Jobst had, in fact, married during the
pendency of the appeal. This conclusion can also be expressed as the court's recognition
that although the state may discourage the exercise of fundamental rights by reducing
government benefits "where a state enacts regulations that affirmatively limit the exercise
of a fundamental right the state must prove that its act serves a compelling end." Valerie
J. Pacer, Note, Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard-is it a Lost Cause? The Undue
Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 295, 302
(1995).
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Burnside v. Burnside,74 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a trial court's
conclusion that a prison inmate had not entered into a valid marriage' despite
the fact that a ceremonial marriage had been performed. 76 Holding that the trial
court had "erred in its declaration and application of the law,"'"I the court cited
Zablocki to affirm the constitutional right to marry even in the prison context.'
The court correctly declined to suggest that some minimal burden may be placed
on the exercise of the fundamental right itself. Indeed, the court supported its
conclusion that marriage is an autonomous right, even under the circumstances,
by noting the many significant aspects of marriage that are viable apart from any
issue of incarceration.1
79
The Missouri Supreme Court's use of Zablocki in an unrelated setting was
similarly accurate and apposite. In Waites v. Waites,8° the court reviewed a
child custody dispute between divorcing parents. Citing Zablocki for the
proposition that it would ordinarily "clothe the interests of parents in the raising
and educating of their children with the right of personal privacy,"'' the court
noted that in the case of conflict between parents, the principle of family privacy
necessarily gave way to a best interests of the child analysis." 2 The Waites court
thus correctly recognized that Zablocki represents an affirmance of the
constitutional right of privacy in marriage and family life, not a suggestion that
the exercise of that right could properly be intruded upon by the state to any
degree.
The next step in the Herndon court's attempt to legitimize its application of
rational basis review to a grandparent visitation statute was to make the
inapposite argument that since, in its view, Zablocki permits "some" regulation
174. 777 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1989).
175. Id. at 662.
176. Id, at 661.
177. Id. at 662. It appeared that the trial court had relied on a "civil death statute"
which had been held unconstitutional in Thompson v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo.
1976). The statute, when in effect, had been construed to prevent a convict from
contracting a valid marriage. Burnside, 777 S.W.2d at 662.
178. Burnside, 777 S.W.2d at 663 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95
(1987)).
179. Burnside, 777 S.W.2d at 663. The court notes, inter alia, that "inmate
marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment ....
[I]n addition, many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance; for
some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an
exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication." Id at 663
(quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 95).
180. 567 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1978).
181. Id. at 330-31.
182. Id. at331.
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of family life, rational basis is appropriate under the undue burden test.'83 As
articulated by Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent in City ofAkron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health,'84 the undue burden test represents an attempt
to accommodate a conflict between two different interests, both of undisputed
constitutional magnitude. In the First Amendment context, for example, the
undue burden test has been applied to reconcile the conflict between an
individual's rights of free speech and association and the government's right and
obligation to conduct legislative investigations. Thus, although the government's
power of inquiry is as great as its power to legislate, 8 ' its inquiries were
impermissible where they destroyed the privacy essential to a group espousing
dissident beliefs.'86 In that context, the Court found that the government's power
of inquiry "infringe[d] substantially" on associational rights.' In the context of
the abortion regulations in Akron, Justice O'Connor framed the conflict as one
between a woman's "personal right" to decide whether to have an abortion and
the state's "important interests" in medical standards and procedures, coupled
with the state's interests in protecting human life.'88
183. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Mo. 1993). Subsequent
grandparent visitation cases have cited Herndon for this idea, in what can only be
described as a "knee jerk" fashion, with no attempt to independently analyze the
postulated relationship between Zablocki and the undue burden test. See, e.g., Campbell
v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Apart from Herndon's own
progeny, however, the Herndon court appears to be the only court to attempt to wed
Zablocki to an undue burden analysis. In Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126 (D.
Utah 1984), decided six years after Zablocki and a year after Akron, a police officer
challenged his termination from the force, made on the grounds that he engaged in plural
marriage in violation of state law. Although the court not only cited Zablocki, and also
discussed the state's interest in requiring compliance with its criminal laws, it made no
reference to the undue burden test and, indeed, used the words "undue burden" in their
lay sense. Id. at 1138-39.
184. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545 (1963) (citing
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959)).
186. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 558.
187. Id. at 545 (citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)).
188. Akron, 462 U.S. at 454. The abortion regulations at issue in Akron, for
example, endeavored to further both aspects of the state's interests in several ways. They
provided that: (1) all abortions performed after the first trimester be performed in a
hospital; (2) that a doctor obtain parental or judicial consent for any abortion to be
performed on an unmarried minor; and (3) that the attending physician provide certain
specified information concerning fetal development, the risks of the procedure, and
possible psychological sequellae. The Akron majority applied a strict scrutiny standard
to find all of these provisions unconstitutional, either because they "unreasonably
infringe[d]" upon a woman's access to abortion or because they intruded upon her right
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Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that under an undue
burden standard, rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny was appropriate
because the right to an abortion "cannot be said to be absolute.,""9 It is, instead,
a "limited" fundamental right 90 inevitably qualified by the state's ever-present
interest in potential life. 9' Given the competing rights at issue in the abortion
context, therefore, Justice O'Connor framed the appropriate inquiry not as
whether some infringement of a woman's right to an abortion occurred, for the
state's compelling interests permit it to permissibly inhibit abortions to some
degree." Instead, Justice O'Connor stated that only when the challenged
regulation of abortion represented an "absolute obstacle" could the law be said
to represent an undue burden."w Absent an undue burden, an appropriate
balancing of competing interests mandated rational basis review. The undue
burden test, in short, is designed to evaluate legislation that has the effect of
pitting two rights or interests of constitutional magnitude against each other.
As a threshold matter, then, the logical flaw in using the undue burden test
to analyze the intrusion occasioned by grandparent visitation statutes is evident
simply in the nature of the test itself Since the only constitutionally significant
interest implicated is the right of parents and children to familial autonomy, the
substantial burden test literally cannot be used to analyze a grandparent visitation
statute. With only one interest at stake, no assessment of how challenged
legislation either furthers or inhibits the competing rights and interests can
occur.' The Herndon court conceded the existence of a constitutional right to
familial autonomy,'95 for example, and the appellant parents argued that the
grandparent visitation statute in question unconstitutionally inhibited their
exercise of that right."s Since the grandparent visitation statute does not further
a constitutionally valid competing interest, however, the next step of the undue
to make the abortion decision free of governmental intrusion by limiting the discretion
of her physician or healthcare provider.
189. Id. at 463 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
190. Akron, 462 U.S. at 465 n.10.
191. Id. at 459.
192. Id. at 461.
193. Id. at 464.
194. In Akron, for example, Justice O'Connor made it clear that the right to an
abortion "can be understood only by considering both the woman's interest and the nature
of the state's interference, because the state possesses compelling interests in the
protection of potential human life and in maternal health throughout the pregnancy." Id.
at 461.
195. Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993).
196. Id.
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burden test cannot be taken; there is nothing to balance against the asserted right
to family autonomy. 97
The Herndon court attempted to circumvent the practical difficulties of
applying the undue burden test in the absence of a conflicting, constitutionally
significant interest in two ways. Its first tactic simply was to adopt Justice
O'Connor's "extent of the infringement" language regardless of the absence of
a comparable context. 98 The court established a comparison between the
intrusion occasioned by an award of grandparent visitation and the intrusion
occasioned by other regulations touching on family life.'99 Since this
comparison did not involve competing rights, the Herndon court could not
actually implement the balancing process involved in Justice O'Connor's analysis
by weighing the validity of the competing interests and by assessing the impact
of the constitutional interest underlying the regulation on the constitutional right
it touches. The court, therefore, made a general comparison between intrusions
the United States Supreme Court has condemned and the effect of the
grandparent visitation statute on the family, concluding that court-ordered
grandparent visitation is appropriate based on this "casual comparison" alone.2"
The second way in which the Herndon court attempted to justify its use of
the undue burden test is by following the King majority, and locating the missing
197. The Herndon court noted that state regulation of the family "is proper and not
unconstitutional" in many circumstances, and its analysis slips into the general deference
to legislative judgment which Justice O'Connor specifically rejected in this context. Id.
at 207, 209-10. See also Akron, 462 U.S. at 465 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
198. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 208. The court referred to "[t]he importance of the
extent of the infringement in a fundamental rights analysis," although the undue burden
test has never been generally applied in cases involving most fundamental rights. Id.
199. Id. at 209.
200. Id. "A casual comparison of the visitation rights contemplated for
grandparents... with the magnitude of the infringement in [the U.S. Supreme Court
cases] demonstrates that no constitutional violation is present .... ." Id. Perhaps wisely,
the Herndon court did not suggest any means of quantifying the relative intrusions, for
it is by no means clear that such a comparison would support the conclusion it wishes to
draw. A state ban on teaching certain foreign languages during school hours, which the
U.S. Supreme Court held to unconstitutionally infringe on child rearing autonomy, Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923), for example, could impose a far more minimal
intrusion on the parent-child relationship than grandparent visitation. Unlike grandparent
visitation it would not separate parents and children who would otherwise be together;
its ban, furthermore could be completely circumvented by providing language instruction
at other times. Instead, the Herndon court simply asserted that "even a casual
comparison" of grandparent visitation and the infringements invalidated by the U.S.
Supreme Court suggests the statute at issue is constitutional, leaving unstated the fact that
an exacting comparison might yield a different conclusion and that the balancing analysis
of Justice O'Connor's undue burden test cannot be applied literally.
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competing interest in a combination of interests and factors of varying logical
and constitutional legitimacy, all added together. This process of discerning a
whole that is greater than its parts required the Herndon majority to borrow the
language of parental rights cases. Using such language out of context, the court
described grandparents as having an "important role in the raising of their
grandchildren." 20' The Herndon court cited no authority for this grandparent
"right," beyond the King majority's words; as the King dissent acidly noted with
regard to this "right," no authority was cited because none exists.0 2 The
Herndon majority also approvingly noted the King majority's assertion that the
state has an interest in "strengthen[ing] familial bonds."2 °" The fatal flaw in this
assertion is, of course, that the constitutional concept of "family" does not
include "grandparent" at all.
Leaving aside this obvious difficulty, however, the Herndon court's
assertion fails on other logical and analytical grounds. Even assuming, simply
for sake of argument, that by "familial bonds" the court really meant
"generational contact"2c 4 and that it thereby described a legitimate state goal,20 5
a grandparent visitation statute is neither a narrowly tailored means of furthering
201. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209.
202. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting).
203. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209 (quoting King, 828 S.W.2d at 632).
204. The court does use this phrase at a later point in its description of the interest
it is advancing. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210 (quoting King, 828 S.W.2d at 632). In
what is perhaps a further attempt to spin familial or generational considerations into the
competing state interest it lacks, Herndon later quoted King approvingly for the
proposition that grandparent visitation statutes are justified as a means of furthering
"loving relationship[s] between family members." Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209-10
(quoting King, 828 S.W.2d at 632). This assertion fails as an impermissible excursion
into paternalism, if not into pure fantasy. The state has no legitimate interest in the tenor
of relationships within a functional family unit or in "making things better" by imposing
a state-approved model of family life.
205. An exercise of the government's legislative power will generally be
considered legitimate if it relates to the health, safety, morals or welfare of its citizens.
See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that
land use regulations satisfy substantive due process unless they have "no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare"). This definition
obviously provides the legislature with considerable latitude. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (upholding a ban on consensual homosexual
sodomy as a rational method of furthering legitimate interests in conventional morality).
However, it clearly stops short of sanctioning legislation with the clear political purpose
of harming or benefitting groups that are simply socially disfavored or particularly
influential. See, e.g., USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (ban on giving
"household" food stamps to groups of unrelated people invalidated in part because its
purpose of harming "hippies" was not legitimate).
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that goal206 nor is it even clear that it is rationally related to that goal. 2°7 As the
King dissent noted, it may sometimes be true that grandparents can share a close
relationship with grandchildren, and in other cases it is not. 8 There is,
furthermore, little evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, that creating a new means
for grandparents to sue their children is a significant source of bonhomie.0 9
Finally, there is ample evidence from all disciplines that judicial intrusion in the
206. Statutes purporting to regulate the exercise of a fundamental right require
"strict scrutiny," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and must be analyzed
in light of any "less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). The State should then prevail "only upon showing
a subordinating interest which is compelling." City of Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960). This standard is articulated in the specific context of grandparent
visitation by Judge Lambert in his dissent to King v. King:.
[Since] parents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining an
autonomous family unit.., court ordered visitation with a minor child by one
outside the nuclear family amounts to an invasion of family autonomy. The
question thus becomes what is the compelling state interest in requiring
visitation ....
King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
207. If, as courts upholding awards of grandparent visitation assert, rational basis
review were appropriate, the standard could be described in these terms.
208. King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
209. Indeed, a statute permitting grandparents to sue for visitation may simply
serve to arm the grandparents with the coercive power of the state. Although many
grandparent visitation suits may be grounded in an unselfish interest in the grandchildren,
a disturbing number of cases and commentators refer to grandparent visitation suits as
veiled attempts to control or punish the grandparent's adult child, and note their
deleterious effect on the parent-grandparent relationship as well as on the child. See, e.g.,
Steward v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Nev. 1995) (describing evidence of the
grandmother's general attempts to control family members, and specifically, her attempt
to control her son through a grandparent visitation suit); Hawk v: Hawk, 855 S.W.2d
573, 576 n.1 (Tenn. 1993) ("[I]t has been suggested that forced visitation in a family
experiencing animosity between a child's parents and grandparents merely increases the
potential for animosity .... "); King, 828 S.W.2d at 633, (Lambert, J., dissenting) ("Mhe
evidence is clear that [the grandfather] is an overbearing individual who intruded with
impunity upon [his son and daughter-in-law's] family life demonstrating total
indifference to their wishes."); Elizabeth M. Belsom, Note, Grandparent Visitation: A
Florida Focus, 41 FLA. L. REV. 179, 207 (1989) (because Florida grandparents may be
more settled than their children, courts should be wary of situations in which
grandparents want to control their children's lives); Elin McCoy, Grandparents Seek
Rights to Visit With Grandchild, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 4, 1984, at Cl (quoting Dr. Justin D.
Call, Chief of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at the University of California Irvine
Medical Center) ("[the grandmother in question] wasn't really interested in her
grandchild; she only wanted control over [her son]").
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family unit is an inevitable source of trauma to the child,210 and may affect the
parents' marriage as well.2 1 In short, grandparents have no legally cognizable
interest in their grandchildren's upbringing, and grandparent visitation statutes
do not further any other legitimate state goal. Viewed either individually or in
sum, the considerations the Herndon court advanced as the "competing interests"
to support its undue burden test are simply unequal to the task.
Although the fundamental nature of the single right at stake in Herndon
makes the Herndon court's application of rational basis review patently
improper, it is by no means clear that the grandparent visitation statute at issue
satisfies rational basis review, even in the lenient form that the court purportedly
applied.2" 2 Rational basis review of a statute is the level of review most
deferential to the legislature's choice in enacting the statute. Thus, "[a]
classification does not fail rational basis review because it is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. '2
Under rational basis review, courts must "accept a legislature's generalizations
even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends."2 4 Although the
extent of the "imperfection" to be tolerated has been the subject of some
disagreement on the Supreme Court,2"5 the disagreement can generally be
reduced to two different conceptions of rational basis review, one comparatively
lenient, under which virtually all legislation will be found acceptable, the other
210. See infra note 317 and accompanying text
211. Sharon F. Ladd, Note, Tennessee Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents
and the Best Interest of the Child, 15 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 635, 652 (1985). "If the
natural parents have a viable marriage, it is not wise to allow parents of either parent to
bring suit as this could have a devastating effect on the marriage .... " Id
212. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993).
213. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
214. Id. at 321.
215. A significant number of courts and commentators agree that rational basis
review has involved varying degrees of judicial scrutiny rather than a single clear
standard. In United States Railroad Retirement Boardv. Fritz, Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority listed eleven U.S. Supreme Court cases which had applied a rational
basis standard of review and commented: "The most arrogant legal scholar would not
claim that all of these cases applied a uniform or consistent test under equal protection
principles." United States R. R. Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10
(1980). See also City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451-52
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the term "rational" and the "continuum of
judicial responses" reflected in the Court's decisional process); United States R. R.
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 182-198 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 472 (1985); Robert J. Glennon, Taxation and
Equal Protection, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261,280-290 (1990).
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more demanding and less deferential to legislative choice." 6 Under "lenient"
rational basis review, "any reasonable basis 21 7 for the statute at issue is
sufficient. In contrast, the more rigorous "traditional" '218 rational basis review
requires factual support for legislative assumptions. Thus, although a court
applying traditional rational basis review may favor the legislature's
understanding of the circumstances it sought to address, the reviewing court may
not overlook those specific circumstances themselves in order to reach a
conclusion based only on general pronouncements.1 9 Under both incarnations
of rational basis review, however, the challenged statute "must find some footing
in the realities of the subject,"' and therein lies the problem for Missouri's
grandparent visitation statute.
Had the Herndon court applied traditional rational basis review to the
grandparent visitation statute before it, its conclusions obviously would have
been quite different, for generalizations regarding "the development of... loving
relationship[s]"' l and a presumption of some unspecified benefit to the
216. Professor Galloway has subdivided rational basis review into two categories
which recognize the different conceptualizations of the standard, describing them as the
"deferential rational basis test" and the "nondeferential rational relation test." Russel W.
Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
449, 451 (1988). Although the Court itself has not expressly acknowledged different
tiers of rational basis review, it has repeatedly recognized and often disapproved the
different faces rational basis review can have. United States R. R. Retirement Board v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 186 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Some justices have further contributed to the difficulties of isolating a single
rational basis standard by suggesting that all constitutional review is rational. These
justices suggest that differences in the level of scrutiny applied are better explained by
examining the interests at stake than by attempting to identify specific analytical tiers.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-14 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); City of
Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 451-55 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
217. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
218. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 186.
219. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) (stating that "mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield that protects
against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme"). For other
examples of the Supreme Court's traditional approach to rational basis analysis, see
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-213 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (holding that rational basis review is satisfied only
when legislation "rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose"); Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 381-82 (1974) (upholding legislation because Congress had
expressly recognized the resulting distinctions and those specific distinctions were
rationally related to the Congressional purpose).
220. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
221. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993).
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grandchild quoted from an opinion in another jurisdiction would not have
sufficed. The United States Supreme Court's use of traditional rational basis
review to invalidate a statute in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.22 illustrates the requirement that available data support the statutory
classification at issue." In Cleburne, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. ("C.L.C.")
endeavored to open a group home for the mentally retarded. A zoning ordinance
required it to obtain a special permit, even though no special permit would have
been required had the group home been a "hospital[], sanitarium[], nursing
homef, or home[] for convalescents or aged, other than for the insane or feeble-
minded or alcoholics or drug addicts," 4 or, indeed, had it been one of a host of
222. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
223. In contrast to Herndon, and indeed to all grandparent visitation cases,
Cleburne involved an equal protection challenge rather than a substantive due process
challenge. Although grandparent visitation cases involve substantive due process
challenges to the statutes at issue, the standard of review applicable to a due process
challenge is to be found in both the United States Supreme Court's due process cases and
in its equal protection cases. During the Court's modem era it has employed an equal
protection analysis far more frequently than it has employed a due process analysis.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 383 (5th ed. 1995).
This does not result from any theoretical preference for equal protection analysis over
due process analysis, but rather reflects the fact that most laws operate by classifying
people in some way. Id. Thus, the Court will generally examine a constitutional
challenge to economic and social regulation, for example, to decide whether the
distinctions that it draws between groups of people are rationally related to a legitimate
interest of the government, rather than examining it to decide if it is rationally related to
a legitimate government interest. Id.
Similarly, if the Court is facing a challenge to regulations affecting fundamental
rights, and determines that the regulations affect only one group of people, it strictly
scrutinizes the classification thus created to determine if it is narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling state interest. If, on the other hand, the regulation affecting a fundamental
right affects everyone's ability to exercise that right, the Court will strictly scrutinize the
regulation to determine if it is nartowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
Id,
Regardless of whether analysis has proceeded under the equal protection clause or
the due process clause, therefore, the standard of review the Court has developed is
identical. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 308 (1993) ("[Respondents' next
contention] is just the 'substantive due process' argument recast in 'procedural due
process' terms, and we reject it for the same reasons."); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 638 n.2;
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 (1975); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). In this article, therefore, no distinction is made between a definition of"rational
basis review" which is articulated in equal protection analysis and a definition of
"rational basis review" articulated due process analysis.
224. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 436 n.3
(1995).
[Vol. 62
34
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/2
1997] FAMILYAUTONOMY VS. GRANDPARENT VISITATION 789
other social or institutional facilities. 25 After C.L.C. submitted the required
special permit, the city council voted to deny it. C.L.C. challenged the ordinance
upon which the council voted, arguing that it "discriminated against the mentally
retarded in violation of the equal protection rights of C.L.C. and its potential
residents." 6 Applying rational basis review, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the ordinance, finding that it bore no rational relationship to any
legitimate governmental purpose.227
The Cleburne Court's application of rational basis review stands in sharp
contrast to the approach taken in Herndon, for the Cleburne Court engaged in
a detailed, factual analysis of the operation of the statute and in a critical analysis
of the justification argued by the state. In Herndon, the court justified the impact
of the open-ended grandparent visitation statute on the Tuheys simply by quoting
from the Kentucky Supreme Courts opinion in King v. King: "the grandparents'
visitation statute was an appropriate response to the change in the demographics
of domestic relations." 8 It explored the argument no further than this, and
attempted no reconciliation of its own pronouncement and the fact that no issue
of family breakdown was before it.
The Cleburne Court, on the other hand, noted that although the state raised
general safety concerns because of the proposed group home's proximity to a
junior high school, closer examination showed that those concerns were merely
"vague, undifferentiated fears." 9 The Cleburne Court commented further that
thirty mentally retarded students already attended the junior high school and that
this fact, rather than some general assumption regarding mentally retarded
individuals, must control. 3
Under traditional rational basis review, then, the grandparent visitation
statute at issue in Herndon cannot be said rationally to address the breakdown
of family life where it is applied to an intact family and applies indiscriminately
to all families, whether they have suffered any "breakdown" or not.
Similarly, the Herndon court's related assertion that the statute is rational
and therefore constitutional because grandparent visitation "will ordinarily
benefit" a grandchild"' fails under traditional rational basis review. Any
coercive state interference in family life has been condemned as harmful to
225. Id.
226. Id. at 437. (C.L.C. lost in District Court, won in the Court of Appeals, and
therefore was the respondent when the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
469 U.S. 1016 (1984)).
227. Id. at 448.
228. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993) (quoting King v. King,
828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992)).
229. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
230. Id.
231. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210 (quoting King, 828 S.W.2d at 632).
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children, no matter how laudable its goal. 2 Whatever philosophical differences
individual professionals may espouse, 3 all disciplines agree that children
require the stability of a continuous relationship with fit parents. Indeed, "the
child's need for ... stability is so great that disruptions of the child-parent
relationship by the state, even when there appears to be inadequate parental care,
frequently do more harm than good." 4 When, as in Herndon, the quality of a
232. See, e.g., Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[D]elay [in
returning the child erroneously removed from his parents to their custody] implicates the
child's interests in family's integrity and in the nurture and companionship of his
parents."). In a marginal aside, the Jordan court rather tartly observes that "the
Commonwealth should not blithely presume in a context as grave as this one where
children have been taken from their families by the state that it is free not to seek review
[of the removal] before the Monday or next business day following a Friday or weekend
removal." Id at 344 n.12. See also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir.
1977) (describing a family's right "t6 remain together without the coercive interference
of the awesome power of the state" as the most fundamental component of familial
privacy). Indeed, grandparent visitation statutes may be particularly irrational in light of
the harm caused by judicial intervention itself. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769,
773 (Ga. 1995).
233. Three cursory examples of the points on the continuum of thought regarding
the best interests of the child help illustrate the range of positions taken. For Joseph
Goldstein, the child's best interests are primarily served by non-intervention, except in
clear cut, truly egregious circumstances of "serious bodily injury" or where parents may
actually have attempted to do them injury. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 72 (1979).
Standards promulgated under the aegis of the American Bar Association, but never
adopted, generally require a less definitive demonstration of injury or threat of injury to
the child, but nevertheless advocate caution in initiating any state intervention. With
regard to cultural differences, for example, these standards note that "failure to recognize
that children can develop adequately in a range of environments and with different types
of parenting may lead to intervention that disturbs a healthful situation for the child."
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT, comment
to § 1.4, at44 (1977).
Farther along the continuum, Professor Garrison advocates inclusive statutory
definitions of abuse and neglect, on a theory that achieving an environment which is both
stable and nurturing is sufficiently important to justify more proactive state intervention.
"[S]eparation from a disturbed home, which produces an improvement in the child's care,
is often preferable to a child's remaining in the disturbed environment." Marsha
Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75
GEO. L.J. 1745, 1780 (1987). These commentators thus advocate stability; differences
arise as to how and where the stability is best achieved.
234. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L REV. 463, 474
(1983); see also ANN. M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES 187 (1983)
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child's family life has not been called into question at all, legislative coercion of
grandparent visitation has what can only be described as an entirely irrational
cast.
Although "lenient" 5 rational basis review would demand less justification
to uphold a challenged statute, it is by no means certain that the grandparent
visitation statute could satisfy this standard of review either. Under lenient
rational basis review, a legislature is not required to "actually articulate at any
time [its] purpose or rationale," 6 and legislation will survive a constitutional
challenge "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis." 7 Furthermore the state need not even "produce evidence to
sustain [its] rationality." 8 Legislation will survive constitutional challenge if
it could have been "based on rational speculation.""rs Although the statute at
issue in Herndon legitimately might seem to have survived rational basis review
given a standard that seems scarcely more than a rubber stamp,24 in practice
even this lenient rational basis review appears to require a more rational footing
than the statute can muster.
("Courts increasingly are recognizing the inherent value in keeping children with their
parents even though the parents may provide only marginal parenting."). The author
subsequently adds the following practical advice: "The attorney for the parent.. . should
emphasize [that] the disruption to the child of any removal from home and placement
with strangers is worse than the speculative danger to the child pending a hearing on the
merits of the case." Id. at 177.
See also Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of"Neglected" Children:
Standards For Removal of Children From Their Homes Monitoring The Status of
Children In Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 639
(1976) ("Because children are strongly attached to their parents, even "bad" parents,
intervention that disrupts the parent/child relationship can be extremely damaging to the
child."); Mookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest? 43 HARV. ED. REV. 599 (1973);
Disruptions of the parent-child relationship have also been strongly disapproved in
custody determinations between fit parents. See, e.g., Delzer v. Winn, 491 N.W. 2d 741,
744 (N.D. 1992) (holding that "[m]aintaining stability and continuity in the child's life
is a very compelling consideration when determining child custody issues").
235. Professor Galloway has labeled these two levels or types of rational basis
review "the deferential rational basis test" and "the non deferential rational relation test."
See Russel W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 449, 451 (1988).
236. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992).
237. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
238. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993).
239. Beach Communications Inc., 508 U.S. at 315.
240. In U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, Justice Brennan, a proponent of
traditional rational basis review, observed that lenient rational basis analysis reduces
judicial review to a tautology. "It may always be said that [a legislative body] intended
to do what it in fact did." U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187 (1980).
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Although lenient rational basis review involves emphasizing specific facts
and data consistent with the scope and operation of the statute in a process less
searching than traditional rational basis review would allow, the process is
nevertheless fact specific, replete with citation to authority, and devoid of bald
assumptions.241 In Heller v. Doe,242 for example, mentally retarded citizens
challenged a statutory scheme that provided fewer procedural protections in
commitment proceedings for them, as a class, than it did for mentally ill citizens.
For example, an involuntary commitment based on mental retardation had to be
established by clear and convincing evidence, while involuntary commitment
based on mental illness had to be proved necessary beyond a reasonable doubt.243
The state contended that the lower standard of proof in commitments for mental
retardation reflected the fact that mental retardation is easier to diagnose than is
mental illness.
Finding a rational basis for the distinction, the Court first noted the well-
established diagnostic differences between the two conditions, supporting its
assertion with multiple citations to five different medical and diagnostic
treatises.2' The Court then related the diagnostic differences thus established to
the circumstances of the case. It noted, for example, that "[m]ental retardation
is a permanent, relatively static condition," so given the class of adults before it,
the characteristics requiring involuntary commitment would be established by
at least an 18 year record. 45 Finally, the Court noted that its conclusions
regarding the nature of mental illness and retardation harmonized with the
greater body of law on the subject. It cited Blackstone, for example, noting that
the distinction between the mentally retarded and mentally ill is rooted in Anglo-
241. The majority opinion in Heller is a particularly apt example of the actual
limits of lenient rational basis review, since three members of the Court found the
majority opinion insufficiently searching. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 335 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 312.
243. Id. at 315.
244. The Court cites AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 29 (3d rev. ed. 1987); AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS
OF SUPPORT 5, 16-18 (9th ed. 1992); SAMUEL J. BRACKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAw 16-17, 137 (3d ed. 1985); JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 71-72 (1981); HENRY J. STEADMAN, EMPLOYING
PSYCHIATRIC PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: POLICY VS. FACT IN DANGEROUS
BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH 123, 125-128 (C. Frederick ed.
1978). Id. at 324-25.
245. Heller, 509 U.S. at 323.
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American jurisprudence. 246 It also cited a United States Supreme Court case
dealing with mental disability and three journal and law review articles.247
Not only did the Herndon court fail to conduct an equivalent review to
establish a rational basis for the grandparent visitation statute before it, it could
not, in fact, have done so had it tried. The Herndon court's first step in a rational
basis review should have been to cite authority for its first justification for the
open-ended grandparent visitation: the fact that society is experiencing "a
general disintegration of the family 48 which could or should be legislatively
addressed. This it did not do, but certainly could have.249
Then, consistent with the Heller approach, the Herndon court should have
related the authority supporting its conclusions regarding family breakdown to
the facts before it. Although under lenient rational basis review a court can
overlook "an imperfect fit between means and ends,""0 the Herndon court would
have been forced to concede that there was no fit at all, for a statute designed to
remedy family breakdown' had been applied where there simply was none.
Finally, the Herndon court should have completed its demonstration of
rationality by establishing that its conclusion fit within the context of other law
and could be harmonized with its own decisions. This, of course, it could not do,
for Missouri courts have generally found judicial intrusion in family life to be an
impermissible threat to family stability and autonomy. In State v. Couch,"2 for
example, the court affirmed the "fundamental concept of our society," that
parents have the paramount right and obligation "to meet the needs of their
children and to provide their material and moral requirements. 2 53 Similarly, in
246. Id. at 326.
247. Id. at 322-25 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)); James W.
Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 414 (1985); Kozol et al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 371, 384 (1972); Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1242-43 (1974)).
248. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo. 1993).
249. Between 1950 and 1992 the number of divorces obtained per year in this
country more than tripled, from 385,000 to 1,215,000. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 73, table no. 87
(115th ed. 1995). For an overview of changes in family structure in the United States and
the corresponding changes in societal values and attitudes, see Joan C. Bohl, The
"Unprecedented Intrusion": A Survey and Analysis of Selected Grandparent Visitation
Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 29-31 (1996).
250. Heller, 509 U.S. at 321.
251. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209.
252. 294 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
253. Id. at 639.
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Aegerter v. Thompson,254 the court held that since the child's parents were totally
responsible for her welfare, they were entitled to autonomy in child rearing
decisions. Grandparent visitation over parental objection, it seems, would
threaten the stability of family life.
The fundamental nature of the single right at stake in Herndon makes
rational basis review improper. The right to family integrity should have
insulated the Tuheys from state control of their family life in the guise of a
grandparent visitation award. The Hemdons' grandparent visitation suit, by
definition, directly infringed upon the Tuheys' responsibilities and on their joint
child rearing decision. It can not be justified, therefore, as an ancillary or
incidental intrusion. Since grandparent visitation implicates no competing
constitutionally significant interests, an undue burden test is logically
inapplicable. Even if, for argument's sake, the undue burden test were to apply,
forcing parents to relinquish their minor child to the custody of a third party,
whether for a day or an hour, is a "significant intrusion".255 Finally, even if
rational basis review were appropriate, the open-ended grandparent visitation
statute at issue finds insufficient "footing in the realities of the subject " 256 to
survive any genuine judicial review.
V. SOURCES OF STATE POWER
The Herndon court erroneously concluded that the state has the inherent
power to override the child rearing decisions of fit parents whenever it concludes
a different altemative would be "better." The court specifically rejected a
finding of harm or a threat of harm to the child as a prerequisite to state intrusion
on family life and opined that this conclusion reflects federal constitutional
law. 7 The court reached this conclusion by citing permissible intrusions upon
family life which it described as intrusions designed simply to improve a child's
life. For example, it characterized Prince v. MassachusettsO' as standing for the
proposition that a state 'has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom'
and 'may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating
or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. '259 In fact, Prince
expressly acknowledged a parent's constitutionally protected right to child
254. 610 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
255. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 212 (Covington, J., dissenting).
256. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
257. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210.
258. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
259. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
169 (1944)).
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rearing autonomy 260 before it identified a narrow exception to that precept
applicable when the child is substantially harmed or threatened with substantial
harm. 26' This misapprehension of the basis of state power over family life leads
to the Herndon courts express rejection of Hawk v. Hawk2 and its requirement
that harm or the threat of harm to the child precede state intrusion in the form of
court ordered grandparent visitation. Finally, Herndon is also in direct conflict
with all other domestic relations cases in Missouri. Missouri opinions recognize
a threshold requirement of harm or the threat of harm to the child, consistently
rejecting any notion that the state can supplant parental decisions simply because
it has concluded that another course of action would be better.
The Herndon court attempted to rest its conclusion that the state has power
to intrude on family life simply to improve it on United States Supreme Court
opinions upholding certain statutes affecting children. The court cited Prince v.
Massachusetts for its validation of child labor laws,263 suggesting that this
demonstrates that state intrusion on family life is constitutionally permissible.2"1
The court also quoted Ginsberg v. New York "The well being of its children is
a subject within the state's constitutional power to regulate. " 265 The court did
not, however, analyze the bases for the specific regulations it cited from Prince.
It did not explore the context of the Ginsberg Court's reference to the "well-
being of minors." It, therefore, did not discover the difference between a
regulation protecting minors from the crippling effects of child labor,2" or a
regulation protecting unsupervised minors from deleterious exposure to
pornography,2 67 and a regulation like the one before it which simply imposes a
judge's preference on fit parents. The court's cursory references completely
missed the threshold requirement of harm embedded in the United States
Supreme Court precedent cited.
The state's only sources of authority to intrude on family life, its police
power and its authority as parens patriae, are limited to situations in which a
child is harmed or threatened with harm; harm is an indispensable prerequisite.
Police power is the power to preserve social order, and its scope is therefore
consonant with the general purposes for which the state was created. Thus, the
state's police power allows the state to override a decision of otherwise fit
260. Prince described child rearing autonomy as "the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter." Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
261. Id.
262. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
263. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. 166-67).
264. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207.
265. Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
266. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
267. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
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parents where the decision could severely harm the child, under a theory that the
survival of its children is essential to society as a whole.
The state's other source of authority to intrude on family life, its parens
patriae power, is also triggered only by a severe threat of harm to the child. As
parenspatriae, the state acts as "father of all" to help children or others "legally
unable... to take proper care of themselves and their property.2 68
In fact, Herndon's interpretation notwithstanding, Prince and Ginsberg
demonstrate the nature of the harm to the child that must precede any state
intrusion on family life. In Prince v. Massachusetts the Court refused to
invalidate legislation which prohibited a "parent" from permitting a minor to sell
pamphlets on a public street, citing the inherent police power of the state.269 The
Court first acknowledged the parent's constitutionally protected right to child
rearing autonomy, characterizing family life as a "private realm"2 ' and noting.
that "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."2 ' Against this backdrop, however, it identified a
narrow exception to this right to familial autonomy, rooted in the survival of
"democratic society" as a whole and applicable when a limitation on parental
control was necessary to insure children's growth and progression towards
maturity and full citizenship. In the case before it, the Court noted that the
child's development was imperiled by the "restraints and dangers" of the street
and by the "crippling effects" of child employment.2"2 The Court therefore
concluded that the statute before it was an appropriate exercise of police
power.273
268. JOSEPH CHI=TY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PEROGATIVES OF THE CROWN
155 (1820). Compare 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47 ("The sovereign (is]
the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics .... ") (cited in Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)). In the American constitutional system the state's
power to act as parens patriae is derived from the King's right and obligation under
English law to act as "guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves."
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 257 (1972).
Althotgh the original exercises of parens patriae authority corresponded to
allegiance paid to the King, by the seventeenth century the nature of parens patriae
authority had changed and expanded. From that point on, orders were issued providing
for the education or support of minors apparently simply because cases of demonstrated
need were brought to the Chancellor's attention rather than because of any direct financial
interest of the Crown. Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law Before and After the Entrance
of"Parens Patriae," 22 S.C. L. REV. 147, 148-52 (1970).
269. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944).
270. Id. at 166.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 168.
273. Id. at 169.
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Similarly, although the Herndon court cited Ginsberg v. New York for the
idea that the state may regulate the family,274 Ginsberg provides an example of
the other type of harm which can justify state intrusion on family life. In
contrast to Prince, which addressed child labor as a threat to "democratic
society," Ginsberg addressed the situation before it as one in which the child, as
opposed to the society, may be harmed. In Ginsberg v. New York,275 the Court
held that the enactment of a statute prohibiting the sale of "girlie" magazines2 76
to minors was a proper exercise of the state'sparenspatriae authority. Appellant
Ginsberg was convicted of selling several such magazines to a minor. He
unsuccessfully appealed on the theory that the magazines in question would not
be obscene for persons seventeen years of age or older, and an individual's
constitutional right to read or see material conceming sexuality should not
depend on his or her age. Rejecting this contention, the Court found that the
legislation in question limited minors' access to material that would "impair
[their] ethical and moral development. 277 The Court noted, further, that the
legislation's impact on the minors was permissible because it did not supplant
any parental authority or decisionmaking. Although minors could not purchase
the material in question, nothing in the statute prohibited their parents from
purchasing it for them, so parents could "deal with the morals of their children
as they saw fit."278 The legislation was therefore a proper exercise of parens
patriae authority. Its impact on the minors' lives occurred only during times
when the minors lacked direct parental supervision and were, therefore,
technically-if fleetingly-without fit parents.
Thus parens patriae power and police power both provide the state with
authority to act to protect children who have been harmed or threatened with
harm by the absence of fit parents and the lack of guidance those parents would
have provided. Although parens patriae power protects the child in need and
police power purports to protect society's interest in insuring its own survival by
274. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, ;97 (1993).
275. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
276. The statute in question defined these magazines, inter alia, as having "that
quality of... representation ... of nudity... [which] (i) predominately appeals to the
prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for
minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." Id. at 633.
277. The Court expressed some doubt that this conclusion could be supported with
any empirical data. It noted, however, that since obscenity is not protected expression
it was required to conclude only that the legislature was "not irrational" in finding that
exposure to the material in question was harmful to minors, a conclusion it could easily
reach. Id. at 641.
278. "Parens patriae" literally means "parent of the country." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th. ed 1990).
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protecting children in need, in practice these terms have been used nearly
interchangeably." 9  Both concepts have been used in Anglo-American
jurisprudence to equate harm to a child with the absence of a fit parent. In
Bellotti v. Baird,28 for example, the Court noted that "[t]he State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent or involvement."28' Similarly, in In re
Gault the Court stressed that where state action impacts a child, parental
involvement is an indispensable component of the due process to which a child
is entitled. 2
Gault involved prosecution of a minor, Gerald Gault, for making "lewd"
phone calls. 83 Gerald was initially detained without any attempt to notify his
parents,2 and his subsequent prosecution was notably lacking in procedural
formality. Although Gault is a landmark statement of the proposition that
"benevolently motivated" judicial discretion in the juvenile context cannot
substitute for procedural formality, it is also significant for its express
recognition of the family integrity right in the context of the parents' role as
protectors of the child. The Court held that Gerald Gault and his parents both
were entitled to procedural protection, not simply because of the minor's
constitutional rights, but because the presence of a minor's parents, in and of
itself, is a necessary part of protecting the minor's rights."5 A determination of
parental unfitness, thus, necessarily describes a "substantial" harm, whether a
court uses that word or not, and, conversely, an allegation of "harm" will not rise
to a sufficiently "substantial" level to serve as a compelling state interest absent
a finding of parental unfitness. The Tuheys' argument that the court could not
order grandparent visitation against their united wishes absent some showing of
harm to their son, Cody, thus simply expressed the well established
279. In Prince v. Massachusetts, for example, the Court cites both the state's
parenspatriae authority and its police power in concluding that the state may restrict a
minor's right to sell pamphlets on the street. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169
(1944).
280. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
281. Id. at 637.
282. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
283. Id. at 4, 6.
284. Id. at 5.
285. Id. at 41, 52-56 (citing with approval a state court decision concluding that
two minors' confessions were involuntary where the children's parents were not allowed
to be with them while they were being questioned).
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constitutional significance of the parent-child relationship.2 8 6 As fit parents, the
Tuhey's decision was-or should have been-beyond any state review.
Hawk not only illustrates the proper operation of this threshold precondition
in the context of grandparent visitation, but also demonstrates the essential
connection the Herndon court missed between a grandparent visitation suit and
other domestic relations law. Hawk held that absent a substantial danger of harm
to the child, parents have a right to care for their children without unwarranted
state intrusion. 7 Thus, Hawk explained that in divorce cases the "harm from the
discontinuity of the parent's relationship" empowers a court to determine child
custody.288 Similarly, in cases of child abuse and neglect the state seeks to
prevent physical harm to the child.289 And where the parent denies the child
medical treatment on religious grounds, the state can intercede to provide
treatment where the condition is life threatening.2' In contrast, grandparent
visitation is qualitatively different; Hawk noted that it involves no harm at all,
only an unprovable and credibly disputed possibility of some "benefit.
'29
'
The threshold requirement of harm thus makes a balancing of state interests
and family rights possible. Without the harm requirement, the state's power
would enable it to countermand any parental decision on the mere supposition
that some alternative was preferable. The state asparenspatriae would become
the state as dictator, transformed into a totalitarian system of child rearing, a
system the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected nearly three quarters
of a century ago. 29 As Hawk correctly concluded, allowing a court to impose
"its own opinion of the best interests of children" in a grandparent visitation suit
diminishes parental rights in other contexts and threatens the broader "privacy
rights inherent in the federal constitution." In fact, despite its express rejection
of Hawk, the Herndon court appears to have suffered from the uncomfortable
premonition that this was exactly the effect of its rejection of any threshold
286. The classic articulation of this precept is probably still Justice McReynolds'
rejection of Plato's suggestions for state-directed child rearing in favor of the American
constitutional conception of an autonomous parent-child relationship. Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
287. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993).
288. Id. at 580.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 581.
292. In Meyer v. Nebraska, Justice McReynolds noted that to "develop ideal
citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent
education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been
deliberately approved by men of great genius their ideas touching the relation between
individual and state were wholly different from those upon which our institutions
rest.... " Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
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requirement of harm. Without such a threshold, potentially limitless awards of
visitation loomed; visitation on a par with normal parental contact, Visitation
which a stroke of the legislative pen could expand to include anyone willing to
allege that court ordered contact was in the child's best interest.293
The Herndon court's response to the logically troubling problem of
sanctioning essentially limitless intrusions on family life was to focus on the
amount of visitation awarded. Characterizing the trial court's extensive and
detailed2" award of visitation to the Hemdons as "excessive," '295 the court noted
that the statute permitted visitation only after the grandparent was "unreasonably
denied" contact with the minor grandchild for more than ninety days.296
Actually, although the Herndon court made no reference to it, a Missouri
appellate court decision had specifically addressed this ninety-day provision
some two years earlier. In Farrell v. Denson297 the court of appeals upheld an
award of grandparent visitation when only forty-five days had elapsed since the
last visitation, concluding that "the 90 [sic] day rule ... is not jurisdictional.""29
This holding notwithstanding, the Herndon court concluded, with no
explanation, that the ninety-day period was a "precondition."2 99 It then stated
that the "precondition" indicated that any award of grandparent visitation made
under the statute should not approximate "parental visitation in custody
matters" 3 or contact that had occurred voluntarily at any earlier point in time."1
The court did not explain how, specifically, the ninety-day provision should limit
293. This is, in fact, exactly what happened in Connecticut. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46(b)-59 (West 1995) was enacted in 1978 as a grandparent visitation statute.
In 1983 it was amended to allow any person to sue for visitation with a child, providing
he or she asserted that it was in "the best interest of the child."
294. The court ordered visitation from 9:00 A.M. until 6:00 P.M. on the first and
third Saturday of each month; this schedule was to change several months later to permit
the Hemdons to have Cody spend one overnight visit with them per month. The
Hemdons were also to have visitation with Cody for two consecutive days, including an
overnight visit during his Christmas vacation, and for one week during Cody's summer
vacation. The Tuheys were also ordered to "notify the Hemdons of all school, social, and
athletic activities in which Cody [was] participating that grandparents would reasonably
be expected to attend." Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Mo. 1993).
295. Id at 210.
296. Id.
297. 821 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
298. Id. at 549 (emphasis supplied). In a move that would have pleased the city
fathers of Sparta, see supra note 295, Farrell stated: "[q]uite simply... [the grandparent
visitation statute] empowers the court to examine grandparent visitation after petition, to
evaluate the best interests of the children and to order reasonable visitation .... " Id
299. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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future visitation awards or why parents should be allowed autonomous child
rearing for eighty-nine days but not ninety. Indeed, after setting up this
amorphous comparison, the court simply asserted that its interpretation "is based
in part on the fact that if the statute allowed a great amount of visitation [it]
would be more likely to... hold that [the statute is] unconstitutional. 30
In fact, as the dissent pointed out, the majority's purported limit on
grandparent visitation simply made the constitutionality of the statute dependent
on the trial court's discretion. If the trial court's visitation award can be
characterized as "minimal," the statute is constitutional. If the award is more
extensive, the statute, chameleon-like, may become unconstitutional. As the
dissent noted, this certainly is no way to order the "decisional process on
questions of constitutionality... [and is] insupportable in terms of traditional
principles of constitutional analysis."3"3  The majority rubber-stamped a
sentimental notion rather than applying the threshold requirement recited in
Missouri domestic relations law, applied in numerous Missouri domestic
relations cases, and implicit in federal constitutional law: the state may not
intrude on family life absent harm to the child.
Cases involving the medical treatment of children against the express
wishes of their fit parents further illustrate the error of Herndon's conclusion
that state authority justifies intrusion on family life simply to improve it. Since
grandparent visitation suits, like medical treatment cases, involve fit parents,
304
the medical treatment cases provide a particularly useful analogy; they not only
illustrate the concept of "substantial harm" in the context of a child with fit
parents but also demonstrate how the threshold requirement of harm limits state
intrusion into family life.
In Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1, 311 for example,
the court concluded that court-ordered blood transfusions of children against the
express wishes of fit parents were consistent with the rule set forth in Prince v.
Massachusetts.3  Jehovah's Witnesses involved a suit by the plaintiff religious
302. Id. at210-11.
303. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 211 (Covington, J., dissenting). It has also proved
unworkable in subsequent Missouri grandparent visitation cases: "We can only wonder
how courts are to determine when visitation has been unreasonably denied [for ninety
days] where, as here, a parent and adult child have become so estranged that they can not
communicate and act only to hurt one another. We can also only wonder what business
courts have getting into such intra-family disputes." Komosa v. Komosa, 939 S.W.2d
479, 482 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
304. If parental unfitness were alleged, the case would be brought pursuant to state
statutes dealing with abused, neglected, or delinquent children.
305. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (one
sentence affirmance).
306. Id. at 504 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
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group, seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant
hospitals and doctors from administering blood transfusions to children of
members of the group? 7 The court noted that providing life-saving medial care
to children who would not otherwise receive treatment was within the state's
parenspatriae authority. Although the court affirmed the primacy of a parent's
right to child rearing autonomy, it concluded that the court-ordered blood
transfusions of children were not inconsistent with that right, because child
rearing autonomy was unaffected except as necessary to save the life of the
child. Furthermore, the statute authorizing emergency medical treatment of
children whose parents withheld consent provided that a child was considered
a ward of the state only for purposes of ordering a blood transfusion and only
when the transfusion was deemed medically necessary by the attending
physician.
Similarly, in Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital, Inc. v Paddock,"'3 the court
issued as limited an order as possible when it authorized a blood transfusion for
a newborn infant over the objections of the Jehovah's Witness parents.? 9
Although the court held that its parens patriae authority required the order,
given the probability that the infant would otherwise die, it noted that had the
parents been able to choose among reasonable alternative treatments for their
baby, the state would have been powerless "to determine the most 'effective'
treatment" and impose that judgment upon them.10 In short, no best interests
determination would have been possible.
This same conviction animates Missouri case law addressing the emergency
treatment of children against the wishes of otherwise fit parents. In Morrison v.
StateP" blood transfusions were ordered for an infant suffering from a fatal blood
disorder,312 over the objections of her Jehovah's Witness parents. The parents
307. Jehovah's Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 491. The plaintiff religious group, its
governing agency and certain individuals sought a declaration of their right to decline
blood transfusions for themselves and their minor children, as well as a permanent
injunction prohibiting defendant hospitals and doctors from administering blood
transfusions to them or their children.
308. 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
309. Id. at 445.
310. Id.
311. 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
312. Testimony of the infant's attending physician and the medical technician in
charge of laboratory records established that the infant suffered from erythroblastic
anemia. Id at 98-99. The attending physician testified that this condition resulted in the
progressive destruction of red blood cells leading to destruction of brain tissue followed
by death. She testified that in her opinion, and that of four other doctors qualified in this
field of medicine and practicing in this community, a blood transfusion was the only
remedy. Id. at 99.
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argued that the parent-child relationship was "sacred," the product of "natural
law," and could not be intruded upon by the state even to save a child's life.31 3
Invoking both the state's police power and its parens patriae authority,31 4 the
court noted the state's obligation to provide essential medical care for a child
where the parents would not. It carefully delimited this concept, however, by
noting that even where the child's life was endangered, the parents' opinion
would not necessarily be overridden "[w]here the proposed treatment is
dangerous to life, or there is a difference of medical opinion as to the efficacy of
a proposed treatment or where medical opinion differs as to which of two or
more suggested remedies should be followed .. .,. 5 The Missouri Supreme
Court's understanding of parens patriae authority, and its deference to the
parent-child relationship thus properly limited state intrusion on the decisions of
fit parents to situations where substantial harm loomed and no medical doubt
arose. Gray areas and judgment calls are the province of the fit parent, not the
state.
Legitimate state intrusion into family life under either the state's police
power or its parens patriae authority thus coincides with substantial harm or the
threat of substantial harm to the child. Where the child has no fit parents, this
harm, by definition, continues. The state necessarily remains an ongoing feature
in the child's life, through foster care, placement services, plus the assorted
means of oversight and regulation which are the sequellae of each. Where the
child has fit parents, however, legitimate state intrusion is coextensive with the
harm. When the harm ends, the state must again forgo all oversight, defer to all
parental decisions, and abandon any nascent plans to improve. If this reflects the
historical and constitutional reality of the concept of family and of family
autonomy, it reflects no less the reality of the human condition.
In reality, at no point in our history have we, as a society, been able to agree
on where a child's best interest lie.316 We know that a child requires at least
minimal care and an uninterrupted relationship with fit parents. We know that
state intrusion into the parent-child relationship is harmful.317 We know that "fit
313. Id. at 101.
314. Id. at 102-03.
315. Id. at 102.
316. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 19 Am. L. Reg. 366, 368 (II1. 1871) ("What is
proper parental care? The best and kindest parents would differ in an attempt to solve
the question.").
317. There is considerable judicial comment both in grandparent visitation cases
and in other contexts concerning the harm inflicted on a child by the litigation process
itself. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 443 (1989) (judicial process
involved in bypassing the parental notification requirement in a statute governing minors'
access to abortion); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 377 (1995) ("Mhe impact of a lawsuit to enforce [visitation] over the parents'
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parent" means nothing more than "adequate parent," '3t8 but beyond this threshold
no agreement exists. There is certainly no consensus regarding the general value
of the grandparent-grandchild relationship. The Herndon court may conceive
of the grandparent-grandchild relationship as a "special bond" '319 of great benefit
to both, and, hopefully, that is often so. Other courts have disagreed, however,
noting the lack of any evidence that this is always, or even most often, the case.
And if some grandparents have a genuine interest in a grandchild, it is an
unfortunate truth others do not, and may, in fact, use a visitation suit to control
and harass their own child, whatever the cost to the grandchild. 2
The results of a longitudinal study undertaken by psychologists at the
University of California, Berkeley underscores society's inability to predict what
the "best" experiences for a child would be. Beginning in 1929, researchers
studied a group of 166 infants bom in that year, tracking aspects of those
individuals' lives for the next thirty years. Among the various analyses made of
objection can only have a deleterious effect on the child."); Hunter v. Carter, 485 S.E.2d
827, 829 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("There is extensive, compelling justification for requiring
a judge to look so closely at the impact of forced visitation on a child and his immediate
family."); Dearborn Fabricating & Eng'r Corp. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1137 (Ind.
1990) (litigation involved in a loss of parental consortium claim); McMain v. Iowa, 559
N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1997) ("Our own court has recognized the adverse effect [on
children] of litigation to enforce visitation."); Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 206 (Utah
1985) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) (litigation involved in a change of custody
proceeding).
318. Hafen, supra note 234, at 473-94. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 234, at 177-
87. See also Wald, supra note 234 at 639-40; Mookin, supra note 234 at 599.
319. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Mo. 1993) (citing King v. King,
828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992)).
320. See, e.g., King, 828 S.W.2d at 633 ("[T]he evidence is clear that [the
grandfather] is an overbearing individual who intruded with impunity upon [his son and
daughter-in-law's] family life, demonstrating total indifference to their wishes."); Steward
v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777, 778 (Nev. 1995) (noting grandmother's attempts to control her
son); Komosa v. Komosa, 939 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("[Paternal]
grandmother and father have a deep and abiding dislike for each other which is
manifested by their continuing warfare over the child."). In Congressional Hearings on
grandparent visitation Dr. Andre Derdeyne, a child psychiatrist, testified that with all his
experience he could not identify characteristics which distinguish grandparents with a
genuine interest in their grandchildren from those who, when their child divorced,
became "completely caught up in attacking their child's former spouse or even attacking
their own child with grave consequences for their grandchildren." Grandparents: The
Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Human Services of the House of Representatives Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess, 77 (1982) (statement of Dr. Andre Derdeyne, Professor of Psychiatry, Director,
Division of Child and Family Psychiatry, University of Virginia School of Medicine);
Belsom, supra note 209 at 207; McCoy, supra note 209 at Cl.
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this fund of data, one monograph focused on the socialization process of children
up to age fourteen. 2' After 200-plus pages of painstaking analysis, the authors
concluded that "[i]f [a child] is under fairly stable and not too discontinuous
pressures and secures enough approval and support ... he becomes, to use the
vernacular, 'socialized'[;] . . . even without this optimum combination, he
frequently arrives at stable maturity [anyway] ... [Wie are not sure that we have
begun to understand how or why.
'022
VI. CONCLUSION
The fundamental flaw in the Herndon decision, Missouri's grandparent
visitation statute, and indeed all grandparent visitation statutes, 3 is the apparent
assumption that all grandparents are good?24 Many, of course, are wonderful.
321
321. JEAN W. MAC FARLANE ET AL., A DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF THE BEHAVIOR
PROBLEMS OF NORMAL CHILDREN BWEEN TwENTY-ONE MONTHS AND FOURTEEN
YEARS (1954).
322. MAC FARLANE, supra note 321, at 221.
323. Grandparent visitation statutes that include a threshold requirement of harm
or the threat of harm to the child, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (1991), are, of
course, iot only constitutionally permissible but desirable, for they provide a legal
avenue for a grandparent to assist the child who lacks a functional unit.
324. See, e.g., Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Mo. 1993); Beckman v.
Boggs, 655 A.2d 901, 909 (Md. Ct. App. 1995) ("[I]t is fundamentally in the best
interests of any child to have contacts with his or her grandparents.") (quoting trial court
with approval); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
941 (1992) ("That grandparents and grandchildren normally have a special bond cannot
be denied. Each benefits from contact with the other. The child can learn respect, a
sense of responsibility and love... "). The fallacy of the assumption has been noted by
otherjudges. See, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d at 635 (Lambert, J., dissenting) ("[The
majority makes] the per se assumption that deprivation of access to the grandparent is
harm. There is no authority for this proposition and it is otherwise illogical."); Hawk v.
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 581 (Tenn. 1993) ("[We also seek to avoid the unquestioning
"judicial assumption" that grandparent-grandchild relationships always benefit children
") (citation omitted).
325. The author would point, for example, to her daughter's own grandfather,
Leland S. Bohl Sr.
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But Good Samaritans,32 6 thieves,327 liars32 and control freaks329 alike may all,
eventually, become grandparents. The question thus is really who will decide
how a child will be raised. Will it be a politician appointed to the bench-for all
judgeships are fundamentally political posts33-or will it be the child's own fit,
married parents?
326. For example, in Coberly v. Coberly, No. 97-00493, a case currently pending
in the Florida Court of Appeals, First District, one set of grandparents is assisting in the
appeal of an award of grandparent visitation, entered in favor of the child's other
grandparents, out of a conviction that the intrusion of the court ordered grandparent
visitation on family life is wrong, and interferes with "necessary parental rights."
Telephone interview with Theodore Wendler, grandfather (June 19, 1997).
327. Cannon v. Strachman, FD-2180-95A (N.J. Super. Jan. 26, 1996)
328. Steward v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777 (Nev. 1995)
329. King, 828 S.W.2d at 630. (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting).
330. In thirty-nine states judges are selected with direct input from the electorate,
Daniel R. Deja, How Judges are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection Process in
the United States, 75 MICH. B.J. 904, 905-06 (1996) (limited jurisdiction judges like
family court judges, are nearly all selected in the same manner as judges of general
jurisdiction courts). Everywhere judicial selection is by executive appointment, giving
the chief executive the opportunity to identify the most qualified candidates for judicial
posts, "political expediency may outweigh considerations of professional qualifications."
Harry 0. Lawson, Methods of Judicial Selection, 75 MICH. B.J. 20,21 (1996). Finally,
the addition of a nominating committee to the judicial selection process, touted for nearly
a century as a way to remove politics from the process, Id. at 23, has been criticized as
simply altering the nature of the politics involved. "It substitutes bar and elitist politics
for those of the electorate as a whole." Id. at 24. See also DAVID R. ROTTMAN, U.S.
DEPT OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1993 (1995) at 48-69.
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